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Abstract
Nowadays, the use of smart devices connected to the Internet by most of the population
is a reality. In an e-society, most transactions and procedures can be performed digitally.
This provides several benefits to the society to which we belong. Nevertheless, new
challenges to overcome have appeared.
This thesis is focused on the privacy of citizens while using vehicular transport systems
within an e-society frame. Specifically, the thesis contributes to two subcategories. The
first one refers to pay-by-phone systems for parking vehicles in regulated public areas.
The second one is about the use of e-tickets in public transport systems allowing transfers
between connecting lines.
Traditionally, payment systems for regulated public parking areas have been based on
the use of pay and display machines. The customer purchases a ticket from a machine
and displays it on the dashboard of the car. Tickets are usually acquired by inserting
coins into the pay station so that the identity of customers is not revealed. Nowadays,
several apps running on the smartphone of customers are available for making this type
of payments. The digitization of this process involves the automatic collection of data
about all the parking transactions performed by all the users which could be used to
deduce sensitive information about people’s mobility.
Public transport systems with transfers between connecting lines are based on the
reusability of tickets in a limited way during an established period of time. There are
several proposals allowing users to purchase one-use e-tickets that guarantee the privacy
of users. Current proposals allowing reusability are not adequate when in-situ inspections
are possible. After an inspection, all the details about user’s journey can be linked and
deanonymized.
A careful analysis of data collected by service providers can provide sensitive personal
information such as: work schedule, profession, hobbies, health problems, political tend-
encies, sexual inclinations, etc. Although the law, like the European GDPR, requires the
correct use of the data collected by service providers, data can be used for illegal purposes
after being stolen as a result of a cyber-attack or after being leaked by an internal dis-
honest employee. Therefore, the design of privacy-preserving solutions for mobility-based
services is mandatory in the e-society.
Resum
L’ús de dispositius intel·ligents, com els smartphones, interconnectats a través d’Internet
és una realitat des de fa anys. En una e-society, part de l’entorn tradicional es veu
reemplaçat per l’entorn digital. Aquest canvi implica millores i beneficis per a les societats
de les quals formem part però també apareixen nous reptes que cal superar.
La present tesi es centra en la privadesa dels ciutadans com a usuaris de mitjans de
transport vehiculars dins del marc d’una e-society. En concret, les contribucions de la tesi
es focalitzen en les subcategories d’estacionament de vehicles privats en zones públiques
regulades i en la realització de transbordaments entre ĺınies intercomunicades en l’àmbit
del transport públic.
Tradicionalment, els sistemes d’estacionament de vehicles en zones públiques, s’han
basat en l’ús dels parqúımetres. Després de pagar un import, en funció de la durada
prevista de l’estacionament, es genera un tiquet dif́ıcilment associable amb el conductor.
Actualment, aquest pagament es pot realitzar digitalment mitjançant una app instal·lada
en un smartphone. Aquesta digitalizació permet associar ineqúıvocament un e-ticket amb
el seu propietari i deduir-ne informació sensible.
Per altra banda, els sistemes de transport públic que permeten transbordaments entre
ĺınies interconnectades, es basen en la reutilització d’un bitllet de forma limitada durant
un peŕıode preestablert. Existeixen múltiples propostes que permeten la compra i ús de
e-tickets d’un sol ús que garanteixen la privadesa dels usuaris. Altrament, en les propostes
que permeten la reutilització d’un e-ticket mitjançant transbordaments, la privacitat dels
usuaris es veu compromesa després d’una inspecció in-situ.
Una anàlisi acurada de les dades recopilades pels provëıdors d’aquests serveis, sobre
un determinat usuari, pot proporcionar informació personal sensible com per exemple:
horari laboral, professió, hobbies, problemes de salut, tendències poĺıtiques, inclinacions
sexuals, etc. Tot i que existeixin lleis, com l’europea GDPR, que obliguin a utilitzar les
dades recollides de forma correcta per part dels provëıdors de serveis, ja sigui a causa
d’un atac informàtic o per una filtració interna, aquestes dades poden ser utilitzades
per finalitats il·legals. Per tant, el disseny protocols que garanteixin la privadesa dels
ciutadans que formen part d’una e-society esdevé una tasca de gran importància.
Resumen
El uso de dispositivos inteligentes, como los smartphones, interconectados a través de
Internet es una realidad desde hace años. En una e-society, parte del entorno tradicional
se ha visto reemplazado por el entorno digital. Este cambio, trae mejoras y beneficios
sobre las sociedades de las que formamos parte pero también aparecen nuevos retos a
superar.
La presente tesis se centra en la privacidad de los ciudadanos en el transporte vehicular
dentro del marco de una e-society. En concreto, las contribuciones de la tesis se centran
en las subcategoŕıas de estacionamiento de veh́ıculos privados en zonas públicas reguladas
y en la realización de transbordos entre ĺıneas interconectadas en el ámbito del transporte
público.
Tradicionalmente, los sistemas de estacionamiento de veh́ıculos en zonas públicas, se
han basado en los parqúımetros. Después de pagar un importe, en función de la duración
prevista de estacionamiento, se genera un tiquet dif́ıcilmente asociable con el conductor.
Actualmente, el pago se puede realizar digitalmente mediante una app instalada en un
smartphone. La digitalización de este proceso suele asociar ineqúıvocamente un e-ticket
con su propietario y con toda la información deducible.
Por otra parte, los servicios de transporte público con transbordos entre ĺıneas in-
terconectadas, se basan en la reutilización de un billete de forma limitada durante un
periodo preestablecido. Existen muchas propuestas que permiten la compra y uso único
de e-tickets que garantizan la privacidad de los usuarios. De lo contrario, la privacidad
de los usuarios se ve comprometida tras una inspección in situ, para las propuestas que
permiten e-tickets reutilizables mediante transbordos.
Una análisi acurada de los datos recopilados por los proveedores de los servicios,
sobre un determinado usuario, puede proporcionar información personal sensible como
por ejemplo: horario laboral, profesión, hobbies, problemas de salud, tendencias poĺıticas,
inclinaciones sexuales, etc. A pesar que hay leyes, como la europea GDPR, que obligan a
usar de forma correcta los datos recopilados por parte de los proveedores de servicios, ya
sea por un ataque informático o por una filtración interna, estos datos pueden utilizarse
para fines ilegales. Por lo tanto, es vital diseñar protocolos que garanticen la privacidad
de los ciudadanos que forman parte de una e-society.
Statement
This thesis fulfills the requirements of the Universitat de Lleida to obtain the degree of
Doctor in Engineering and Information Technology.
Acknowledgements
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter is a brief introduction to the general concepts, the main objectives, and the
contributions of this thesis.
It first presents an introduction to smart cities. Next, the chapter focuses on vehicular
systems and the privacy concerns that arise in such systems. After that, the objectives
and contributions of the thesis are explained. Finally, the structure of the document is
detailed.
1.1 Smart cities
The urban population of the world has grown from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in
2018. In 2018, 55.3% of the world population lived in urban areas, a proportion that is
expected to increase to 60% by 2030. In 2018, there were 33 megacities (cities with 10
million inhabitants or more) and this figure is projected to rise to 43 in 2030 [Nat20a].
This situation has made it urgent to find smarter ways to manage large cities [CDN09].
The tendency of making cities smart makes them susceptible to including new methods
of computerization which could be integrated into services with an already established
infrastructure [KM16].
According to Caragliu et al. [CDN09] a city is smart when “investments in human and
social capital and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) communication infrastructure
fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise management of
natural resources, through participatory governance”.
Some of the benefits of a city being smart are: efficient resource utilization, better
quality of life, higher levels of transparency and openness [Nua+15]. The Centre of
Regional Science (SRF) of Vienna University of Technology, in its research reported
in [Gif+07], found that there are many fields of activity related to the smart city term. A
smart city performs well the six key characteristics of urban development: smart economy,
smart mobility, smart governance, smart living, smart people, and smart environment.
Table 1.1 illustrates the six characteristics and their assigned factors. Compliance
with these characteristics indicates the degree of conversion to a smart city.
Several software applications have been developed within the scope of smart cities. For
1
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Smart Mobility International accessibility
(Transport and ICT) Availability of ICT-infrastructure
Sustainable, innovative and safe transport systems
Participation in decision-making
Smart Governance Public and social services
(Participation) Transparent governance
Political strategies & perspectives
Cultural facilities
Health conditions
Smart Living Individual safety





Affinity to life long learning
Smart People Social and ethnic plurality
(Social and human capital) Flexibility
Creativity
Participation in public life
Attractiveness of natural conditions
Smart Environment Pollution
(Natural resources) Environmental protection
Sustainable resource management
example, smart buildings use applications to optimize the use of locally produced sustain-
able energy and the local grid capacity [Dhu+15; Mon+13]. Smart adaptive light applic-
ations can improve traffic flow and reduce CO2 emissions and air pollution [Bod+14].
Other smart applications can monitor water pressure and detect water leaks in real
time [BM15]. These software applications usually collect large amounts of data com-
ing from different sources such as computers, smartphones, sensors, GPS, cameras, etc.
This huge amount of information is analyzed by means of the so-called big data [KB15;
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Nua+15] technology.
The volume of data generated by smart cities has grown exponentially. These data
provide information, in many cases in real time, about the city and its citizens. The
analysis of these data offers several advantages [Kit13]:
• It helps citizens to make day-to-day decisions.
• It helps governments to offer a more efficient and effective city.
• It helps corporations to generate new business opportunities.
On the contrary, the collection and correlation of this large amount of data allow
the creation of detailed profiles of citizens. The collection of sensitive citizen data is a
business case [Sch05] and is a problem in smartphone applications [Li+15]. This is the
reason why smart cities are a major threat to the privacy of citizens.
Unfortunately, privacy protection is not usually within the indicators used to determ-
ine the smartness of cities. In [PR20], the term privacy only appears once. Fortunately,
the use of technologies in a smart city is determined by their acceptance by the cit-
izens. Therefore, the protection of citizens’ privacy will be a condition imposed by users.
Privacy-friendliness plays a key role in the success of the smart cities of the future [EW18].
1.2 Privacy in vehicular systems
Smart mobility is one of the characteristics of a smart city. It is dedicated to improv-
ing the efficiency of public transport and the management of private vehicles [PBS13].
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are a technology which allows traffic safety and
efficiency to be increased, and other applications to be enabled in the domain of vehicu-
lar communication [Sch+08]. Many applications can be included under the terms of
business and entertainment, like music downloading, fleet management, simpler vehicle
maintenance or payment for parking or road usage (Table 1.2).
All this digitization opens up the possibility of massive data collection by automatic
monitoring. Individual information about transport movements allows private informa-
tion to be inferred, such as the place of residence and work, work schedule, hobbies, or
even health problems.
On the other hand, privacy is a fundamental right explicitly stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), reflected in Article 12: “No one shall be subjec-
ted to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks” [Nat20b]. Legislation like the European
GDPR [Com18] protects the citizens with regard to the processing of personal data col-
lected by any organization. Although service providers are forced to comply with the
law, such regulations cannot prevent misuses conducted by criminals that have broken
into system servers.
For this reason, privacy must be a key aspect in the design of secure systems and proto-
cols involving the mobility of people and vehicles. That is the case for electronic transport
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Table 1.2: Overview on applications for VANETs
Category Situation/Purpose Application examples
Dangerous 1. Curve speed warning 2. Low bridge warning
road features 3. Warning about violated traffic lights or stop signals
Abnormal traffic 1. Vehicle-based road condition warning
and road conditions 2. Infrastructure-based road condition warning
3. Visibility enhancer 4. Work zone warning
Active safety Danger of 1. Blind spot warning 2. Lane change warning
collision 3. Intersection collision warning
4. Forward/rear collision warning
5. Emergency electronic brake lights
6. Rail collision warning 7. Warning about pedestrians crossing
Crash imminent 1. Pre-crash sensing
Incident occurred 1. Post-crash warning 2. Breakdown warning 3. SOS service
Emergency response 1. Approaching emergency vehicle warning
2. Emergency vehicle signal preemption
Public service 3. Emergency vehicle at scene warning
Support for 1. Electronic license plate 2. Electronic drivers license
authorities 3. Vehicle safety inspection 4. Stolen vehicle tracking
Enhanced driving 1. Highway merge assistant 2. Left turn assistant
3. Cooperative adaptive cruise control
4. Cooperative glare reduction 5. In-vehicle signage
Improved 6. Adaptive drivetrain management
driving Traffic Efficiency 1. Notification of crash or road surface conditions to
a traffic operation center 2. Intelligent traffic flow control
3. Enhanced route guidance and navigation
4. Map download/update 5. Parking spot locator service
Vehicle 1. Wireless diagnostics 2. Software update/flashing
maintenance 3. Safety recall notice
4. Just-in-time repair notification
Mobile services 1. Internet service provisioning 2. Instant messaging
Business/ 3. Point-of-interest notification
Entertainment Enterprise solutions 1. Fleet management 2. Rental car processing
3. Area access control 4. Hazardous material cargo tracking
E-payment 1. Toll collection 2. Parking payment 3. Gas payment
tickets [Mut+12], pseudonym management in vehicular networks [Pet+15], management
of parking space [Yan+11; Hua+18], or vehicle location proof systems [Zha+15].
This thesis focuses on privacy in the following areas of vehicular systems:
• Parking systems. Parking systems can be classified into several categories: parking
spot search systems, reservation systems, payment systems, etc. This thesis focuses
on pay-by-phone parking systems for regulated public parking areas. Just after
parking, the driver simply has to log into the app and indicate the car license plate
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number, the area of the city she has parked in, and the expected duration. Parking
enforcement officers should be able to determine the payment status of parked cars
so that the presence of an online server with access to all the data about parking
transactions is required. These data are highly sensitive since they allow private
information about drivers to be inferred. So as to preserve the privacy of drivers,
the only information that should be managed by the system is that making it pos-
sible to check whether or not appropriate payment for a given parked car has been
made.
• Transport systems. This thesis has addressed public transport systems that
allow transfers between connecting lines. In the digital era, the replacement of
paper-based tickets with electronic ones (e-tickets) is a reality. Users, with the
required app installed in their personal smartphones, can purchase an e-ticket to
perform the desired trip. The information managed by the ticket issuer must not
make it possible to trace the way a specific user uses public transport. Regarding
data privacy, the app must guarantee anonymity and unlinkability among all the
trips performed with a given e-ticket, even after an inspection.
1.3 Objectives
This thesis aims to contribute to the design of phone-based protocols that preserve the
privacy of users in vehicular systems. We have analyzed current systems, designed new
ones, and added new features to existing proposals.
More specifically:
• Parking systems. Existing privacy preserving pay-by-phone parking systems have
been studied and analyzed in depth. Our objective in this area has been to design
systems in which a unique payment is performed at the beginning of the parking
operation. In this way, the mobile device of a driver may be out of coverage while
her car is parked without causing any risk of being fined.
• Transport systems. We have performed an in-depth study and analysis of sev-
eral existing phone-based e-ticket proposals that preserve the users’ privacy. Our
research in this area has focused on proposals that allow the reuse of an e-ticket.
The main objective was to design an e-ticket system in which, even after an inspec-
tion, the transport system is only able to determine whether the user is allowed to
perform the current trip.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis is composed of three contributions. As a result of them, three scientific papers
were written. Two of them have been published in international scientific journals. The
third was presented in an international conference on e-society privacy and published in
the corresponding proceedings.
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The abstract of the resulting papers together with a short description of their contri-
butions are included below:
1. “Parking tickets for privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking” published
in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society in
London, United Kingdom [BS19].
Abstract. Traditionally, the payment required for parking in regulated areas has
been made through parking meters. In the last years, several applications which
allow these payments to be performed using a mobile device have appeared.
In this paper we propose a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system offering
the same privacy as the traditional paper-based method even assuming an internal
attacker with full access to all the information managed by the system servers.
Drivers’ privacy is preserved without requiring them to trust any party. Further-
more, the system can tolerate that the mobile devices of drivers fall out of coverage
while their cars are parked.
Contribution. The paper presents a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking
system in which the driver performs a one-time payment at the beginning of a
parking operation. This avoids the need to perform periodic micro-payments (e.g.
each 5 minutes) and therefore the mobile phone may become unavailable while the
car is parked. In addition, drivers can recover the money corresponding to unused
time if the parking operation takes less time than initially expected.
2. “A Construction for Providing Reusability to Mobile Phone-Based e-
Tickets” published in the international open access journal IEEE Access [BS20a].
Abstract. Nowadays, the use of electronic tickets in public transport is a reality.
Several mobile phone-based e-ticket systems have been proposed so far. Even so,
very few of them include reusability in the sense that a single e-ticket allows several
journeys to be made. Although the identity of users is usually hidden behind a
pseudonym, the existing proposals providing reusability allow the system to link all
the journeys made with a given e-ticket.
In this paper we present a privacy-preserving construction allowing a mobile phone-
based e-ticket system to be endowed with reusability. The privacy of users is proven
to be preserved even assuming an internal attacker with full access to all the inform-
ation managed by the system servers. All the sensitive interactions of a user with
the system remain anonymous and unlinkable. Further, as a result of an inspection,
the system is only able to determine whether the inspected user is allowed to make
the current journey.
Contribution. We present an extension, or plug-in, that can be coupled to any
existing privacy-enabled ticketing system so as to provide the reusability property.
In this way, a limited number of trips can be made before an expiration time which
is set at the moment of ticket validation. Regarding data privacy, the construction
guarantees anonymity and unlinkability among all the trips made with a given e-
ticket, even after an inspection. This aspect constitutes the main contribution of
the paper.
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3. “An efficient privacy-preserving pay-by-phone system for regulated par-
king areas” published in the international journal International Journal of In-
formation Security [BS20b].
Abstract. Traditional pay-and-display ticket machines currently coexist, but will
probably be replaced in the near future with pay-by-phone applications. Such applic-
ations facilitate the payment for parking in regulated areas. Companies providing
this service collect and manage information about all the parking transactions per-
formed by drivers. That information is very sensitive and can be used to generate
reports on the parking history of drivers, posing a threat to their privacy.
This paper proposes a pay-by-phone parking system in which the service provider
is prevented from being able to track the parking transactions of drivers. The new
proposal requires drivers to be connected only at the beginning of a parking transac-
tion, or at the moment of indicating that a parking transaction took less time than
expected. Prototype experiments have shown that the new proposal is much more
efficient, in terms of computational cost, than the most complete previously existing
system, while providing the same functionalities and higher security.
Contribution. The contribution consists of a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone
parking system providing all the functionalities of [BS19] but avoiding the use of
cut-and-choose checks. In this way, its computational cost is significantly lower. For
instance, on the server side, the new proposal is approximately 8.5 times faster at
generating e-coins and 80 times faster at issuing tickets, when compared with [BS19].
1.5 Structure of this thesis
This thesis has been divided into several chapters. Their content is summarized below:
• Chapter 1. This is an introduction to the scope of our research. It summarizes
the objectives and contributions of the thesis.
• Chapter 2. This chapter introduces and explains the cryptographic primitives
and tools used in the design of our proposals. The chapter also defines the notation
used throughout this dissertation.
• Chapter 3. This is dedicated to the contribution presented in the research paper
“Parking tickets for privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking” [BS19]. The chapter
begins with a description of previous related work. Next, it presents the system
model designed and describes the proposed system together with a performance
analysis.
• Chapter 4. This chapter presents the research in the paper “A Construction for
Providing Reusability to Mobile Phone-Based e-Tickets” [BS20a]. First, the reader
is introduced to the research area of privacy-preserving e-tickets for transport sys-
tems. Then, the system model and the novel proposed system are presented. Next,
the privacy and security of our proposal are analyzed. The chapter is concluded
with a performance analysis resulting from an implemented simulator.
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• Chapter 5. This includes the contributions summarized in the article “An efficient
privacy-preserving pay-by-phone system for regulated parking areas” [BS20b]. The
chapter first details the aspects of [BS19] which needed to be improved. Next, the
new proposal is described. Its security and performance are compared against [BS19].
• Chapter 6. The last chapter includes a summary of the thesis achievements. Some
open issues for future research are suggested.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter summarizes the cryptographic primitives and tools used in the design of the
contributions of this thesis. It also introduces the formal notation used in this dissertation.
2.1 Hash functions
A hash function [NY89] is a cryptographic one-way function that, given an arbitrary
message, M , provided as input, computes and returns a fixed-length (recommended to
be between 160 and 512 bits long) digest of M as output. Given a hash function H and
data M , we denote the resulting digest as H(M).
A cryptographic hash function must provide the following characteristics to be con-
sidered secure [Gol01]:
1. Preimage resistance. Given m, it must be computationally hard to find M such
that m = H(M). A hash function for which preimages cannot be found efficiently
is said to be one-way or preimage resistant.
2. Second preimage resistance. Given M , it must be computationally hard to find
M ′ 6= M such that H(M) = H(M ′). A hash function for which second preimages
cannot be computed efficiently is said to be second preimage resistant.
3. Collision resistance. It must be computationally hard to find two different mes-
sages, M and M ′, such that H(M) = H(M ′). A hash function for which collisions
are hard to find is said to be collision resistant.
The main cryptographic hash functions are summarized in Table 2.1.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman identified the need for one-way hash functions [DH76].
The first definitions, analysis and constructions for cryptographic hash functions were
given in the late 1970’s. Rabin [Rab78] proposed a design with a 64-bit result based
on the DES block cipher [NBS77]. The limitations of block cipher based hash functions
resulted in a series of designs from scratch. During the 1980’s the need for fast and secure
hash functions became clear.
In 1989, Rivest developed an 8-bit Message-Digest Algorithm named MD2 [Kal92].
Then, in the early 1990’s, Rivest proposed the MD4 [Riv91] and MD5 [RD92] functions.
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Table 2.1: Summary of cryptographic hash functions
Algorithm (Variant) Year Output Security attacks
MD4 [Riv91] 1991 128 bits [Ste06; Wan+04b]
MD5 [RD92] 1992 128 bits [Ste06; Wan+04b; Kĺı05]
HAVAL [ZPS93] 1993 128-256 bits [Wan+04b]
SHA-0 [NIS93] 1993 160 bits [WYY05b]
SHA-1 [NIS95] 1995 160 bits [WYY05a]
SHA-2 (SHA-256) [NIS02] 2002 256 bits [SS08]
SHA-2 (SHA-384) [NIS02] 2002 384 bits [SS08]
SHA-2 (SHA-512) [NIS02] 2002 512 bits [SS08]
SHA-2 (SHA-224) [NIS08] 2004 224 bits [Aok+09]
SHA-2 (SHA-512/224) [NIS12] 2012 224 bits [DEM15]
SHA-2 (SHA-512/256) [NIS12] 2012 256 bits [DEM15]
SHA-3 (SHA3-224) [NIS15] 2015 224 bits [DDS14a; Guo+19]
SHA-3 (SHA3-256) [NIS15] 2015 256 bits [DDS14a; Guo+19]
SHA-3 (SHA3-384) [NIS15] 2015 384 bits [DDS14a; Guo+19]
SHA-3 (SHA3-512) [NIS15] 2015 512 bits [DDS14a; Guo+19]
MD5 has been one of the most widely used hash functions, although it is currently out
of date due to serious security issues [Ste06]. In 2005, Vlastimil Kĺıma published an
algorithm that can find an MD5 collision in 8 hours using a personal computer [Kĺı05].
In 1993, the NIST (National Institute for Standards and Technology, USA) proposed
an improved version of MD5, called SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm), with a 160-bit result.
This version is referred to as SHA-0 [NIS93].
In 1995, NIST discovered a weakness in SHA-0 [WYY05b], which resulted in a new
release of the standard published under the name SHA-1 [NIS95].
In 2002, NIST published another family of hash functions commonly called SHA-2:
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 [NIS02], motivated by the discovery of new attacks on
SHA-1 [WYY05a].
In 2005, NIST specified a new family of Secure Hash Algorithms named SHA-3 to
substitute the SHA-2 family (although attacks against it were not published until a few
years later [SS08; Aok+09; DEM15]). The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic
hash functions: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384 and SHA3-512 [NIS15].
In 2007, NIST announced the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition [20b].
In 2012, KECCAK [Ber+13] was the winning algorithm for the SHA-3 family. Since the
KECCAK hash function was made public in 2008, there has been intensive crypto-analysis
from the research community [DDS12; DDS14b; Din+15; GLS16].
Although all hash functions have been attacked in some way, some of the attacks
cannot be considered to be practical at the moment. According to [Inf20], the following
hash functions are considered to be cryptographically strong: SHA-256, SHA-512/256,
SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384 and SHA3-512.
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Hash functions are a powerful tool used for a variety of purposes [SG12]:
1. Integrity and authentication. Hash functions allow message authentication and
integrity to be achieved without the use of symmetric encryption [BCK96a].
2. Digital signatures. Hash functions are employed in the scope of digital signature
schemes [Gau07] to reduce the size of the data to be signed. The signer only signs
the digest of the message.
3. Authentication of users in computer systems. Hash functions are used
to store the digest of users’ passwords in authentication systems. In this way,
passwords remain secure even after an attacker obtains access to the user re-
gistry [LHH02].
4. Digital timestamping. Hash functions and digital signatures are used to imple-
ment digital time stamping [HS91].
5. Pseudo random number generation. Hash functions can be used as a building
block in the implementation of Pseudo Random Number Generators [BCK96b;
HHR06].
6. Unique data identification. Hash digests allow unique data to be identified, and
duplicate information and data corruption to be detected [Yan+13].
2.2 HMAC functions
An HMAC function is a keyed cryptographic one-way function [BCK96a]. Given a mes-
sage M and a key K, we denote the resulting digest as HMACK(M). The relation
between a message M and its HMAC digest can only be determined if key K is known.
Given a hash functionH, the algorithm for computing HMACK(M), described in [KB00],
is as follows:
- B ≡ Byte-length of the blocks of data of the hash function.
- L ≡ Byte-length of the hash output.
- ipad ≡ Byte 0x36 repeated B times.
- opad ≡ Byte 0x5c repeated B times.
- K ′ is a fixed B bytes key assigned as:
· If |K| < B then K ′ = K and append the byte 0x00 to K ′ until |K ′| = B;
· Else if, |K| > B then K ′ = H(K);
· Else, K ′ = K.
- Compute
HMACK(M) = H(K ′ ⊕ opad||H((K ′ ⊕ ipad)||M)).
The security of an HMAC function lies in the security of the underlying cryptographic
hash function, H, and the size and randomness of key K. Also, the choice of the opad
and ipad constants is important [PSW12].
According to present knowledge, it is recommended to take H as a hash function of
the SHA-2 or SHA-3 families [Inf20].
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2.3 Public key encryption schemes
Encryption schemes can be classified as:
1. Symmetric encryption schemes. The data to be protected are encrypted and
decrypted using the same key. The main disadvantage of these schemes is the need
to exchange the secret key between the sender and the receiver of data.
2. Asymmetric encryption schemes. The receiver of data has to be in possession
of two keys, a public key and a private key. Then, data are encrypted under the
public key, whereas decryption requires the private one. The main advantage of this
approach is that the public key can be known by all parties, even by an attacker,
so that no secret key needs to be exchanged secretly.
Figure 2.1 depicts the two types of encryption. Twofish, AES, Blowfish, DES, 3DES,
Safer and IDEA are popular symmetric encryption schemes. On the other hand, RSA
and ElGamal are widely known public key encryption schemes.
Figure 2.1: Symmetric/Asymmetric schemes
[Source: www.ssl2buy.com]
2.3.1 RSA encryption scheme
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman presented the idea of a public key (or asymmetric) encryp-
tion. The Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol is a method for securely exchanging
cryptographic keys over an insecure channel [DH76].
The protocol was followed shortly afterwards by L. R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L.
Adleman who proposed a public-key cryptosystem called RSA [RSA78] in 1978. RSA is
a widely known cryptosystem whose security holds on the assumed intractability of the
Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) [Sch82].
If Alice has to send an encrypted message M to Bob, they must proceed as follows:
1. Key generation. Bob has to generate a private/public key-pair. An RSA public
key is a tuple (N, e) composed of a hard-to-factor modulus N = pq (p and q are large
prime numbers) and a public exponent e, where 1 ≤ e ≤ φ(N) and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1.
The RSA private key is an integer d that satisfies de = 1 (mod φ(N)). Bob sends
his public key to Alice through any channel (whether or not secure).
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2. Encryption. To encrypt the message M , with M ∈ Z∗N , Alice must use Bob’s
public key, (N, e). She computes M ′ = M e (mod N) and sends M ′ to Bob.
3. Decryption. Ciphertext M ′ is decrypted by Bob using his private key, d. He
computes M = M ′d (mod N) to obtain the original message M .
The security of the RSA encryption scheme lies on the unfeasibility of factoring the
modulus N into its prime factors. According to [Inf20], N should be at least 2000 bits
long (≈ 2048 bits).
2.3.2 Optimal asymmetric encryption padding
Optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP) is a procedure used to pad a short m-bit
sequence to a longer n-bit one [BR95]. It is commonly used with RSA encryption to pad
a message to RSA modulus length [Fuj+04]. The algorithm is schematically represented
in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Optimal asymmetric encryption padding scheme
[Source: Wikipedia]
It uses a pair of cryptographic hash functions G and H to pad a message M so that
its length becomes that of the RSA modulus. The scheme has two parameterized integers
k0 and k1 so that n = k0 + k1 +m.
The M ′ = OAEP(M) function returns a padded sequence M ′ from input M . The
steps to encode M are described below:
1. Pad M with k1 zeroes.
2. Generate a random r of k0 bit length.
3. Seed G with r and generate m+ k1 pseudo-random bits, denoted by G(r).
4. Let X = (M ||0 . . . 0)⊕ G(r).
5. Seed H with X and generate k0 pseudo-random bits, denoted by H(X).
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6. Let Y = r ⊕H(X).
7. Return M ′ = (X||Y ).
The inverse function, M = OAEP−1(M ′), returns the original M from M ′. The steps
to decode M ′ are described below:
1. Compute r = Y ⊕H(X).
2. Recover (M ||0 . . . 0) as X ⊕ G(r).
The OAEP scheme is a Feistel-like construction which generates a pseudo-random
output by calling two internal hash functions. Any input to OAEP−1 not being the
output of a previous call to OAEP produces a pseudo-random result.
After decoding, the plaintext-awareness property, with probability 1− 2−k1 , is given.
If such property is not required, we can set k1 = 0. It is recommended that the crypto-
graphic hash functions used, G and H, have a digest length larger than 256 bits [Inf20].
2.4 Digital signatures
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman first described the notion of a digital signature [DH76]. A
digital signature is a cryptographic scheme which demonstrates the authenticity of a
message M transferred through an insecure channel.
The properties provided by a digital signature scheme are:
• Authentication. The receiver must be convinced that the message was signed by
the sender.
• Integrity. The message has not been modified after being signed.
• Non-repudiation. The signer cannot deny having signed the message.
Signature schemes are built over an asymmetric key system. The private key is used
to sign while the public one is used to verify the signature. Signature schemes are usually
used in conjunction with a cryptographic hash function [Gol01]. Digital signature schemes
are composed of the following algorithms [DK00]:
1. Key generation. The signer, S, is required to create a private/public key pair.
2. Signature generation. SignS(M) denotes the resulting signature on message M
computed using S’s private key. Signatures are usually computed over the hash
digest of the message, SignS(H(M)), so as to reduce its computational cost.
3. Signature verification. The signed message can be verified later employing
signer’s public key.
There are multiple digital signature schemes that are based on different intractable
problems. The most important ones are listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Digital signatures schemes
Scheme name Author Intractable problem Year Reference
RSA R. Rivest, A. Shamir Integer Factorization (IFP) 1978 [RSA78]
and L. Adleman
DSA US NIST Discrete Logarithm (DLP) 1991 [NIS13]
Schnorr C. P. Schnorr Discrete Logarithm (DLP) 1990 [Sch90]
Okamoto T. Okamoto Integer Factorization (IFP) 1985 [OS85]
Feige-Fiat-Shamir U. Feige, A. Fiat Quadratic Residue (QRP) 1988 [FFS88]
and A. Shamir
ECDSA US NIST Elliptic Curve Discrete 2005 [05]
Logarithm (ECDLP)
2.4.1 DSA digital signature
The DSA digital signature scheme is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme [ElG85].
It was proposed by the NIST in August 1991 to be used in its Digital Signature Stand-
ard [NIS13]. It is based on the difficulty of computing the DLP [McK90]. It has been
revised four times since its release. Its last revision was performed in 2013. The signature
generation procedure is faster than in RSA while its verification algorithm is slower.
Its protocols are defined as:
1. Key generation. First, three parameters (p, q, g) have to be set. Take two large
primes p and q such that p− 1 is a multiple of q. Then, select a generator g of the
order q cyclic subgroup of Z∗p.
A secret key V is generated by taking a random value in the [0, q − 1] range.
A public key P is computed as P = gV (mod p).
2. Signature generation. A digital signature for message M is computed as follows:
(a) Choose a random k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ q.
(b) Compute R = gk (mod p) (mod q).
(c) Compute S = k−1(H(M) + rx) (mod q).
(d) The signature is the tuple {R, S}.
3. Signature verification. To verify a signature {R, S} the receiver must proceed
as follows:
(a) Compute w ≡ S−1 (mod q).
(b) Compute u1 = H(M)w (mod q) and u2 = Rw (mod q).
(c) Compute v ≡ (gu1yu2 (mod p)) (mod q).
(d) Verify whether v = R.
According to [Inf20], for a usage period up to and including 2022, the bit-length of
the prime p should be at least 2000 (≈ 2048 bits).
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2.4.2 RSA digital signature
The RSA digital signature is based on RSA cryptosystem [RSA78]. RSA signatures can
be verified very fast if the public exponent e of the public key is small.
The protocols composing this scheme are described below:
1. Key generation. An RSA public key is a tuple (N, e) composed of a hard-to-
factor modulus N = pq (p and q are large prime numbers generated randomly) and
a public exponent e, where 1 ≤ e ≤ φ(N) and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. The RSA private
key is an integer d that satisfies de = 1 (mod φ(N)).
2. Signature generation. To sign the message M , where M ∈ Z∗N , the signer
computes S = Md (mod N). The {M,S} pair is a data-signature tuple.
3. Signature verification. To verify a signed message {M,S} the receiver must
compute and verify Se (mod N) = M .
The security of the RSA scheme depends on the unfeasibility of decomposing the
modulus N into its prime factors. According to [Inf20], N should be at least 2000 bits
long (≈ 2048 bits).
RSA simulated signatures
RSA digital signatures under a given public key (N, e) can be simulated by any party by
taking an integer S ∈ Z∗N and computing M = Se (mod N). The resulting pair {M,S}
is a valid data-signature tuple.
2.5 Blind signatures
In 1983, Chaum introduced the concept of blind signatures [Cha83]. Blind signatures
are derivatives of digital signatures and have some additional features. The purpose of
a blind signature protocol is to prevent the signer, Bob, from observing the message
he signs and the signature; hence, he is later unable to associate the signed message
with Alice [MOV01]. Blind signatures are fundamental for applications that guarantee
user anonymity, e.g. e-cash, e-voting, direct anonymous attestation, and anonymous
credentials.
A blind signature scheme consists of three parts [Cha83; Sch20]:
1. Key generation. The signer, Bob, generates a private/public key pair.
2. Blind signature generation. This is an interactive protocol between Bob and
Alice:
(a) Alice blinds the message M , with a random parameter r as M ′ = Blindr(M).
M ′ is sent to Bob.
(b) Bob signs the blinded message σ′ = SignBob(M
′) with his private key and sends
σ′ to Alice.
(c) Alice unblinds σ′ to obtain σ, the signature on M .
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3. Blind signature verification. Anyone can verify the signature σ over the message
M using Bob’s public key.
A blind signature scheme must guarantee two properties [JLO97; PS96]:
1. Blindness. It is unfeasible to link any valid message-signature pair (M,σ) to the
instance of the blind signature generation protocol in which it was created.
2. Unforgeability. The only way to obtain a valid (M,σ) pair is executing the blind
signature generation protocol with a signer holding a private key.
Several blind signature schemes have been designed over the past 35 years. These
schemes are based on intractable problems such as Integer Factorization, Discrete Log-
arithm, Quadratic Residue, Bilinear Pairings, Lattices, etc. [Asg11].
In 1983, Chaum proposed a blind signature scheme based on RSA and the hardness
of the IFP [Cha83].
In 1994, two blind signature schemes based on the DLP were proposed. The first
one was based on the modified DSA [CPS94] while the second was based on the Nyberg-
Rueppel signature scheme [NR93]. Regarding Nyberg-Rueppel-based schemes, they have
suffered repeated attacks [LL00] and improvements since their first proposal. Several
other DLP-based schemes have been proposed. In 1996, a blind signature protocol based
on Schnorr signature scheme [Sch90] was proposed in [PS96]. In 2001, Schnorr improved
the scheme by adding another computationally intractable problem, ROS, so that the
scheme would remain secure. In 1998, an improved version of Okamoto-Schnorr blind sig-
nature scheme was proposed in [Poi98]. In 2002, Wagner described the first-known attack
on Schnorr and Okamoto-Schnorr schemes [Wag02]. In 2019, Fuchsbauer et al. [FPS19],
improved Schnorr’s scheme to be secure against Wagner’s attack [Wag02]. In 2000, a blind
signature protocol based on ElGamal signature scheme [ElG85] was proposed in [MEE00]
but it was proven to be weak in [HL01].
In 1998, Fan-Lei proposed a fast blind signature scheme based on the Quadratic
Residue Problem [FL98]. In 2000, Shao proposed an improvement of Fan and Lei’s
scheme [Sha00], but a year later it was shown that Shao’s scheme is vulnerable to Pollard-
Schnorr attacks [FL01]. However, in 2002, Hwang, Lee and Lai [HLL02] showed that
Fan-Lei’s scheme did not provide the blindness property.
2.5.1 DSA blind signature
The proposal [CPS94], published in 1994, is the first blind signature scheme proposal
based on the DLP. The scheme is designed as a variant of the DSA digital signature
scheme (Section 2.4.1).
Its procedures are presented below:
1. Key generation. Bob generates a public/private key pair:
(a) He chooses a large prime p so that p− 1 has a large prime factor q, and takes
g as primitive root of p.
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(b) He chooses a random number x, where x ∈ Zq and computes y = gx (mod p).
(c) Let y be the public key. Let x be the private key.
2. Blind signature generation. This is computed by means of the following inter-
active protocol:
(a) Bob chooses a random k̃ where k̃ ∈ Zq. Then, he computes R̃ = gk̃ (mod p).
If gcd(R̃, q) = 1 then he sends R̃ to Alice. Otherwise, Bob must choose another
random k̃.
(b) Alice receives R̃, checks gcd(R̃, q) = 1, and randomly chooses α, β ∈ Zq.
Then, she computes R = R̃αgβ (mod p). If gcd(R, q) = 1 then she computes
M̃ = αMR̃R−1 (mod q) and sends M̃ to Bob; otherwise, Alice chooses another
α, β ∈ Zq.
(c) Bob computes σ′ = k̃M̃ + R̃x (mod q) and sends σ′ to Alice.
(d) Alice computes σ = σ′RR̃−1 + βM (mod q) and r = R (mod q).
(e) The (r, σ) pair is a signature on M .
3. Blind signature verification. Anyone can verify a signature using Bob’s public
key y, by computing T = (gσy−r)M
−1
and verifying r = T (mod q).
A brief security overview of the DSA-based blind signature scheme is provided below:
1. Blindness. Intuitively, it is easy to see that two message-signature pairs (M, (r, σ))
and (M ′, (r̃, σ′)), where r̃ = R̃ (mod q), are statistically independent of each other
and cannot be linked to the random variables α and β.
2. Unforgeability. The generation of a valid message-signature pair (M, (r, σ)) is
unfeasible because the scheme is based on the difficulty of solving the DLP.
As in the DSA digital signatures, the security of the DSA blind signature scheme depends
on the length of p which should be at least least 2000 bits long (≈ 2048 bits) [Inf20].
2.5.2 RSA blind signature
The first proposed blind signature scheme [Cha83] is based on RSA digital signatures
(Section 2.4.2).
Its procedures are as follows:
1. Key generation. Bob generates a private/public key pair:
(a) He chooses two random large primes p and q and computes N = pq and
φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
(b) He chooses two integers e and d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) and gcd(e, φ(N)) =
1.
(c) Let (e,N) be the public key.
(d) Let d be the private key. He keeps the (p, q, d) tuple secret.
2. Blind signature generation. This consists of a three step protocol:
(a) Alice chooses a random r ∈ Zn, verifies gcd(r,N) = 1 and computes M ′ =
reH(M) (mod N). She sends M ′ to Bob.
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(b) Bob signs, under private key d, the blinded message as σ′ ≡ M ′d (mod N).
He sends σ′ to Alice.
(c) Alice unblinds the blinded signature σ′ computing σ ≡ σ′r−1 (mod N). The
resulting σ is a digital signature over H(M).
3. Blind signature verification. Anyone can verify the signature σ over message
M , using the Bob’s public key (e,N), by verifying σe = H(M) (mod N).
A brief security overview of Chaum’s RSA-based blind signature scheme is given
below:
1. Blindness. The use of the random blinding factor, r, ensures that pair (M,σ) is
statistically independent of pair (M ′, σ′), which can be viewed by Bob during the
blind signature generation.
2. Unforgeability. If the hash function H is secure and the RSA problem is assumed
to be unfeasible then this scheme is unforgeable. Complete proof can be found
in [MSS98; Bel+08].
As with the RSA digital signature, the security of the RSA blind signature scheme requires
a long length for N . According to [Inf20], N should be at least 2000 bits long (≈ 2048
bits).
2.6 Partially blind signatures
A partially blind signature scheme is an extension of blind signature schemes that allows
a signer, Bob, to explicitly include necessary information (expiration date, collateral con-
ditions, or whatever) in the resulting signatures under some agreement with the message
owner, Alice.
Generally, a partially blind signature scheme consists of three protocols [AO00]:
1. Key generation. A signer, Bob, generates a private/public key pair.
2. Partially blind signature generation. This is an interactive protocol between
Bob and Alice. The public input is the agreed information Info. The private input
by Alice is the hash of message M while the private input by Bob is his private key.
At the end of the protocol Alice obtains the tuple (Info,M, σ) where M and the
signature σ are only known by her. We will denote σ = PartialSignBob(M, Info).
3. Partially blind signature validation. Anyone can verify the signature σ over
the message M and the agreed information, Info, using Bob’s public key.
In 1996, the notion of partially blind signatures was introduced in [AF96]. It was
not until the year 2000 that a partially blind signature scheme was published that gave
proof of completeness, partial blindness and unforgeability assuming the hardness of the
DLP [AO00].
In 2004, a partially blind signature scheme was proposed. It employed bilinear pairings
that give signatures of short size [CYC04]. In the same year a new proposal was based on
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the DLP and the Chinese Remainder [HC04]. A year later it was shown that this latter
scheme was not secure [ZC05].
In 2005, the identity-based (ID-based) restrictive blind signature scheme from bilinear
pairings was proposed [CZL05]. A few years later, the scheme was shown not to be
secure [HH08].
In 2007, [LSK07] presented a scheme based on the Schnorr signature scheme, which
is used for applications due to its reduced computation cost.
In 2012, Blazy et al. [BPV12] presented a protocol in which the public part is chosen
by the signer avoiding the agreement between the parties before running the protocol.
In 2018, a new scheme based on chaotic map and factoring problems [TIA18] was
proposed. It is much more efficient than the previous proposals like [TSI08].
2.6.1 WI-Schnorr partially blind signature
Abe and Okamoto proposed a partially-blind signature scheme in [AO00], based on the
Schnorr signature scheme [Sch90]. Its security is DLP-based.
The procedures to sign a message M with the agreed information Info are:
1. Key generation. Bob generates a private/public key pair.
(a) He chooses two random large primes p and q such that q|p− 1.
(b) Let g ∈ Zp∗ such that g has order q. Let 〈g〉 denote a subgroup in Z∗p generated
by g.
(c) He chooses public hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and F : {0, 1}∗ → 〈g〉.
(d) Let x ∈ Zq be the private key.
(e) Let y = gx (mod p) be the public key.
2. Partially blind signature generation. This is an interactive four-step protocol:
(a) Bob randomly chooses u, s, d ∈ Zq. Then,
i. He generates the hash on Info as z = F(Info).
ii. He computes a = gu and b = gszd.
iii. Finally, he sends a and b to Alice.
(b) Alice randomly chooses t1, t2, t3, t4 ∈ Zq. Then,
i. She computes the hash digest of Info as z = F(Info).
ii. She computes α = agt1yt2 and β = bgt3zt4 .
iii. She computes the hash digest ε = H(α||β||z||M).
iv. Finally, she computes e = ε− t2 − t4 (mod q) and sends e to Bob.
(c) Bob computes c = e−d (mod q) and r = u− cx (mod q). Then, he sends the
tuple {r, c, s, d} to Alice.
(d) Alice, computes
i. ρ = r + t1 (mod q).
ii. ω = c+ t2 (mod q).
iii. σ = s+ t3 (mod q).
iv. δ = d+ t4 (mod q).
Finally, she stores the signature as a tuple {ρ, ω, σ, δ}.
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3. Partially blind signature validation. A signature is valid if it satisfies ω + δ ≡
H(gρyω||gσ||F(Info)δ||F(Info)||M) (mod q).
2.7 Elliptic curves
An elliptic curve E over a prime finite field Fp is defined using the Weierstraß general
equation as
Y 2 + A1XY + A3Y = X
3 + A2X
2 + A4X + A6; Ai ∈ Fp.
The graphical representation of two elliptic curves defined over R can be seen in Figure 2.3.
If the characteristic of p /∈ {2, 3} then the elliptic curve can be expressed with the reduced
Weierstraß equation,
Y 2 = X3 + AX +B,
with A,B ∈ Fp and 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0 (mod p) [HM05; Tra06].
The set points of (x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp satisfying expression E together with the point
at infinity, O, are denoted as E(Fp). An addition operation can be defined over E(Fp)
which endows it with an abelian group structure with O being the identity element.
Figure 2.3: Elliptic curves y2 = x3 − x and y2 = x3 − x+ 1
[Source: Wikipedia]
It is easy to see that if (x, y) ∈ E(Fp) then (x,−y) is also in E(Fp). Therefore, a point
(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) can be expressed as (x, b), with b being a boolean that indicates whether
y > −y. A compressed point (x, b) is expanded by computing the two square roots of
x3 + Ax+B (mod p) and selecting one of them as indicated by bit b.
An addition operation can be defined over the set E(Fp) using the chord-tangent
method. Given two points P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ), where P,Q ∈ E(Fp) and
xP 6= xQ, the result point, R = (xR, yR), given by R = P +Q is calculated as follows:xR = λ2 − xP − xQyR = λ(xP − xR)− yP where λ = yP−yQxP−xQ .
Figure 2.4 represents the addition operation over two points of an elliptic curve.
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Figure 2.4: Elliptic curve point addition R = P +Q
[Source: www.medium.com]
The opposite point of P = (x, y) is −P = (x,−y). The scalar multiplication can
be calculated as Q = nP = P +
n· · · + P , where n ∈ N. The Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is a computationally hard problem [HM05]. Given two
known points, P,Q ∈ E(Fp), the problem aims to find an integer n ∈ N which solves the
equation Q = nP [HM05].
2.7.1 Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) schemes were proposed independently, in 1985, by
Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller [Mil85]. Their security holds on the apparent intractability of
ECDLP [HM05]. The use of ECC has become widespread due to the fact that it allows
smaller key sizes to be employed. Table 2.3 compares the size ratios between ECC and
RSA keys for equivalent security levels.
Table 2.3: Key size comparison between ECC and RSA
Bit level ECC RSA Ratio
80 160 1024 1/6
112 224 2048 1/9
128 256 3072 1/12
192 384 7680 1/20
256 512 15360 1/30
The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [GHS10] and the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [05] are elliptic curve-based encryption and
digital signature schemes, respectively.
The ECIES encryption scheme is composed of the following procedures:
1. Set-up. Bob and Alice must choose:
(a) An elliptic curve E whose set E(Fp) has a cardinality divisible by a large prime
p. An order-p point P of E(Fp) is also chosen.
(b) A Key Derivation Function (KDF) constructed from a hash function H.
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(c) An encryption/decryption function for a symmetric-key encryption scheme
(E/E−1).
(d) A Message Authentication Code (MAC) such as HMAC.
2. Key generation. A private key is set by taking a random integer kB in the [0, p−1]
range. The corresponding public key is given by point KB = kBP .
3. Encryption. Alice encrypts a message M for Bob by using Bob’s public key KB
following the steps below:
(a) Randomly select r ∈ [1, n− 1] and compute R = rG.
(b) Derive a shared secret S = Px where P = (Px, Py) = rKB and P 6= O.
(c) Derive keys as kE||kM = KDF (S).
(d) Encrypt the message c = EkE(M).
(e) Compute d = HMACkM (c) and send {R, c, d} to Bob.
4. Decryption. Bob decrypts a ciphertext {R, c, d} using his private key as follows:
(a) Derive a shared secret S = Px where P = kBR.
(b) Derive keys kE||kM = KDF (S).
(c) Check d = HMACkM (c). If the previous checking is satisfied, he decrypts
M = E−1kE (c).
The algorithm ensures an n bit security level for p ≥ 22n, with p being the order of
point P . According to [Inf20], n should be at least 240 bits long (224 / n / 256 bits).
2.7.2 Embedding elliptic curve points in ZN
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fp, with p being a 224 bits prime, and let N
be a 2048 bits RSA modulus. Although there are multiple procedures for embedding an
elliptic curve point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp) into an integer M ′ ∈ ZN , such as [SSA17], below
we detail a procedure designed by us.
Let us denote this procedure as Embed(P ):
1. Represent P = (x, y) in compressed form (x, b) and compose the 225 bits sequence
M = x||b.
2. Set m = 225, k0 = 1823, k1 = 0 (our proposal does not require plaintext-awareness),
and n = 2048, and run OAEP(M), to pad M into a 2048 bits long string M ′.
3. If M ′ ≥ N then run OAEP(M) again taking a different random seed until M ′ < N .
4. Return M ′ as an element of ZN .
The reverse procedure, denoted Embed−1(M ′), returns the original elliptic curve point
P from M ′ as:
1. Unpad M ′ into M by computing M = OAEP−1(M ′).
2. Compose the compressed point (x, b) by parsing M .
3. Uncompress (x, b) into the elliptic curve point (x, y).
4. Return P = (x, y).
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If M ′ was taken at random, the previous procedure may fail at step 3 if the elliptic
curve E does not have any point with such an x-coordinate. The probability of such
failure is about 1/2.
2.8 Range proofs of committed values
In 1988, Brassard, Chaum and Crepeau introduced the concept of commitment scheme
in the context of the problem of flipping a fair coin over the phone [GC88]. A commit-
ment scheme [Gol01] is a two-stage cryptographic primitive. In the commit stage, Alice
commits a chosen value while keeping it hidden from Bob. In the opening stage, Alice
reveals the committed value to Bob.
In general, Alice commits E to Bob as follows:
1. Commit. Alice chooses a random parameter c and commits E; so that Commitc(E)
denotes the resulting commitment.
2. Open. To open the committed value, Alice reveals the parameter c to Bob.
Any commitment scheme must meet the following properties:
1. Alice cannot change the committed value.
2. Bob obtains no information about the committed value.
3. Alice can convince anyone about the committed value when she reveals it.
Some commitment schemes allow it to be proven in zero-knowledge that a committed
number lies in an interval. The first approach to prove that a committed integer lies in
a specific interval was published in [Bri+88].
The [Bou00] proposal allows it to be proven in zero-knowledge that a committed
number lies in an interval [a, b] efficiently. Given a Commitc(E), Alice can prove to Bob
in zero-knowledge that a ≤ E ≤ b without revealing E. The proposal is built on the
Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment scheme [FO98].
2.9 Trusted timestamping
A trusted timestamping service is composed of a timestamp authority (TSA) which
provides signed evidence about the existence of data M at a given Datetime [Ada+01].
To generate a timestamp over M [HS91], the TSA concatenates the current time to
H(M) and calculates another hash of this concatenation asH(Datetime||H(M)). Finally,
this hash is signed with the private key of the TSA as SignTSA(H(Datetime||H(M))).
To verify the signature, the client must assure that TSA signs the hash message of M
with the correct time included.
Chapter 3
Pay-by-Phone parking system
The content presented in this chapter was summarized in the scientific paper “Parking
tickets for privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking” presented in the 18th ACM Work-
shop (2019) in London, United Kingdom, and published in the proceedings of the men-
tioned conference [BS19]. The proposed system has been designed to be implemented as
a mobile application.
3.1 Introduction
In the late 1920s, Roger W. Babson filed several parking meter patents [Bab34]. In most
proposals, after inserting coins into a pay station, a paper ticket to be placed on the
dashboard of the car is issued.
The massive deployment of smart devices has facilitated the development of applica-
tions allowing such payments to be performed through the mobile phone [20c; 20d; 20e;
20f; 20j; 20h; 20a; 20i]. Upon parking, the driver simply has to log into the mobile app
and indicate the car license plate number, the area of the city she has parked in, and
the expected duration. The amount to pay is then deducted from a pre-paid balance, or
charged directly on the driver’s credit card.
Parking officers check the parking status of a car by typing its plate number into
a mobile device which indicates whether or not a valid payment has been made. This
requires the presence of an online server, accessible from parking officers’ devices, with
access to the data allowing the payment status of cars to be determined. These data are
highly sensitive since they allow private information to be inferred about drivers, such as
their work schedules, hobbies, or even health problems. To avoid unnecessary risks, the
only information that should be managed by the system is that allowing a parking officer
to check whether or not an appropriate payment for a given parked car has been made.
Privacy is a key aspect in the design of secure systems and protocols involving
the mobility of people and vehicles. That is the case for electronic transport tick-
ets [Mut+12], pseudonym management in vehicular networks [Pet+15], management of
parking space [Yan+11; Hua+18], or vehicle location proof systems [Zha+15].
To avoid security breaches from inside the service provider, pay-by-phone parking sys-
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tems should be designed by considering it as a party which might try to infer information
about drivers’ parking habits. This excludes checking the payment status of a car just
from its plate number. In that case the service provider could simply query the system
periodically with a targeted plate number and obtain accurate information about the
time periods for which the traced car has been parked. Hence, the payment status of a
car has to be determinable only from one-time pseudonyms which can only be obtained
by a parking officer located close to the car. This makes it necessary to include some
kind of on-board device providing one-time pseudonyms when requested by a parking
officer [Pér15; GMS17].
3.2 Related work
Nowadays, there are several pay-by-phone parking systems [20c; 20d; 20e; 20f; 20j; 20h;
20a; 20i], but none of them addresses driver privacy. These mobile applications collect
and store accurate data about each parking operation so that the generation of reports
about parking habits can be performed in a straightforward manner.
These mobile applications are currently developed for the most important platforms:
Android (Google) and IOS (Apple). Some of them can also be executed on obsolete
BlackBerry devices [20d; 20f; 20a].
All these applications, except [20c], use a start-duration method in which the drivers
are required to estimate the time during which the car will be parked. In [20c], a start-
stop method is used in which the driver indicates the end of parking when removing the
car.
Regarding the payment method, all the applications allow payment by credit card.
The PayPal electronic payment method [20g] is supported by some of them [20c; 20a; 20i].
Finally, proposal [20d] uses its own payment method called Parkmobile wallet. In [20i]
payments can also be made by entering a bank account number. Table 3.1 summarizes
the features of several pay-by-phone parking system applications.
Table 3.1: Summary of pay-by-phone parking system applications
Parking system Payment Platform Parking
Credit card PayPal Others Android IOS BlackBerry period
ParkRight [20e] 3 7 7 3 3 7 start-duration
Pango [20c] 3 3 7 3 3 7 start-stop
Parkmobile [20d] 3 7 3 3 3 3 start-duration
PayByPhone [20f] 3 7 7 3 3 3 start-duration
PayStay [20h] 3 7 7 3 3 7 start-duration
Telpark [20j] 3 7 7 3 3 7 start-duration
Elparking [20a] 3 3 7 3 3 3 start-duration
RingGo [20i] 3 3 3 3 3 7 start-duration
Recent research works [Pér15; GMS17] have proposed systems that consider driver
privacy. Both proposals share a similar system model. Pre-paid e-coins are used for
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anonymous payments. In addition, an RFID-enabled device is to be placed in cars and
queried by parking officers when checking the parking status of cars.
In [Pér15], when a driver parks her car, an anonymous e-coin payment for the expected
parking duration is made. That payment is linked to a random identifier which is stored in
the on-board device. When a parking officer checks a car, he queries its on-board device
to obtain the random identifier which is then sent to the system server to determine
whether a payment linked to it has been made. At that time, the parking officer can link
the car license plate number to the current identifier, and from the data stored on the
system servers, that identifier can be linked to the start and end times of the parking
operation. Hence, the exact start and end times of the parking operation of that car are
determined.
The proposal in [GMS17] provides better privacy: the parking officer, when checking
the parking status of a car, only obtains a boolean indicating whether or not a valid
payment for the checked car has been made. That proposal performs periodic micropay-
ments for short-time intervals while the car is parked. A payment can only be linked to a
plate number after querying the on-board device. In that case, the car can only be linked
to the payment performed for the current short-time interval so that the start and end
times are kept secret.
The system proposed in [GMS17] was the most complete privacy-preserving pay-by-
phone parking system when our research began. Unfortunately, if the driver’s mobile
device could not perform some of the micropayments due to a lack of coverage, low
battery or any other cause, the driver could be fined. Our proposal provides all the
features of [GMS17] and, additionally, solves the mentioned drawback.
3.3 System and adversary models
In the proposed system, payments are performed for short-duration time intervals (e.g.
5 or 10 minutes). As a result of paying for a given time slot, the driver receives a ticket
for that slot.
When a parking operation begins, the driver pays and obtains a ticket for each of the
time slots composing the expected parking time. Tickets are paid using pre-paid e-coins.
So as to preserve privacy, the e-coin system employed must be untraceable, like [Cha83].
This excludes the use of transferable cryptocurrencies with a publicly available transaction
history [Nak09; But14; Pro20]. In our proposal we had to design an ad-hoc e-coin system
able to deal with valued and no-valued e-coins. Finally, the unused tickets can later be
revoked in advance.
3.3.1 System model
The system model (Figure 3.1) is composed of the following actors:
1. Mobile application (or app). This is run on the mobile device of drivers. It
allows them to acquire pre-paid credit (in the form of e-coins), request tickets,
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revoke unused tickets, and provide a ticket when requested by a parking officer.
2. System server. This is an on-line platform accessed by the mobile application to
manage parking operations, and by parking officers to check the payment status of
cars.
3. On-board device (RFID). This is placed inside cars and queried via RFID by a
parking officer during an inspection.
4. Parking officer. He patrols regulated parking areas, queries the on-board device
of cars, and asks the system server about their parking status.
5. Timestamp authority or TSA. This issues timestamps upon request by the
system server.
Figure 3.1: System model
A push notification service [BM16; RK13] allows data to be sent from servers to mobile
applications. In our system, the mobile application requests an ID PUSH identifier which
is sent to the server together with the car plate number. In this way, the server will be
able to send messages to the corresponding app. To avoid linking parking payments from
IP addresses, an anonymous channel [19c] is used. It masks the IP address from which a
client accesses a server.
3.3.2 Adversary model
The adversary model considered equals the one described in [GMS17]:
1. The mobile application and the on-board device cannot be corrupted.
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2. System servers and parking officers will follow the protocol steps as specified but
may collaborate with an adversary by providing all the data to which they have
access.
From the service provider’s point of view, drivers are untrusted parties which might
try to obtain parking time without paying for it. Drivers may intentionally execute a
modified protocol in order to obtain beneficial results. This attack could be carried out
collaboratively by several drivers.
3.3.3 Design objectives
In this section we describe the design objectives. Privacy objectives are equivalent to
those in [GMS17]. An additional objective regarding system tolerance to mobile phones
going out of coverage has been added.
1. Tickets can only be linked to a car plate number as a result of a parking status
check performed by a parking officer located close to the car.
2. The information provided by a driver during a parking inspection only allows it to
be determined whether or not a ticket for the current time exists.
3. During a parking operation, the mobile app only needs an Internet connection at
the beginning and at the moment of revoking unused tickets.
Objective 1 implies that the parking status of a car cannot be tracked automatically
(a parking officer has to be in situ).
Objectives 1 and 2 determine that the information collected by the system provides an
advantage to the creation of parking profiles. The information an attacker can obtain is
exactly the same as it would obtain by roaming parking places and collecting information
about parked cars.
Objective 3 was not addressed in [GMS17]. It states that a driver will not be fined
due to her phone being out of coverage during a parking inspection.
3.4 System proposal
3.4.1 System overview
A driver installs an app into her mobile device which manages an electronic wallet that
is loaded with pre-paid e-coins (which can be valued or no-valued). E-coins are acquired
by running the “E-coin request” procedure. The price of a valued e-coin corresponds to
the price for parking during a time slot. These e-coins are purchased in batch and paid
via some online payment method like credit card. No-valued e-coins are free of charge.
Upon parking, a driver generates a ticket for each of the (consecutive) slots that
compose the expected parking time by running the “Ticket generation” procedure. Each
ticket is paid anonymously via a valued e-coin and stored in the mobile app.
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Figure 3.2: Abstract graphic
So as to hide the expected parking duration, the app always requests the same amount
of tickets. Those tickets in which the driver expects to be parked are paid through valued
e-coins while the remaining dummy ones are paid with no-valued ones (Figure 3.2).
When an inspection takes place, the parking officer, by running the “Parking inspec-
tion” procedure, first queries the on-board device of a car and then asks the system server
to determine the parking status of that car. The system server then runs the “Ticket
request” procedure so as to ask the mobile application for the corresponding ticket.
If the car is removed earlier than expected, unused valued tickets can be revoked
through the “Ticket revocation” procedure. A valued e-coin is provided in exchange for
each revoked ticket.
3.4.2 System description
This section details the procedures that compose the proposed privacy-preserving pay-
by-phone parking system.
System parameters generation
This procedure must be run by the service provider before deploying the service:
1. Generate an RSA [RSA78] key pair for the system server. Let VS be the private
key (only known to the server) and let PS be the public key.
2. Generate an RSA key pair for the timestamp server. Let VTSA be the private key
(only known to the timestamp server) and let PTSA be the public key.
3. Generate a tuple (p,q,g) of DSA [NIS13] public set-up parameters which are stored
at the system server.
Remark. The system server will use its key pair to (blindly) sign e-coins and tickets
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during their issuance, thus preventing malicious drivers from being able to forge them.
Timestamps will be issued to avoid disputes regarding the revocation status of tickets.
Application setup
A driver must install the app into her mobile device and enter the car license plate
number and a credit card number (necessary to pay for the purchased e-coins). The
app will then connect to the on-board device and send the plate number and the cur-
rent time. The on-board device then sets its internal clock and generates an RSA key
pair: VD (private) and PD (public). The public key PD is transmitted to the mobile app.
Remark. The on-board device key pair will be used to generate signed messages
which are returned to parking officers after being queried by them. Possession of such a
signed message proves that a parking officer was located close to the car when a parking
inspection took place.
E-coin request
The app includes a wallet which stores e-coins that are generated through a protocol run
between the app and the system server. A valued e-coin has a price while no-valued ones
are free of charge.
A valued e-coin is generated as follows:
1. The app performs a credit card payment for the requested e-coin1.
2. The app generates a DSA key pair VC/PC over the (p, q, g) parameters.
3. The app generates an even number x ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2)].
4. The app computes H(PC ||gx) and asks the server to compute an RSA blind signa-
ture on it.
5. The app consequently obtains SignS(H(PC ||gx)) .
A no-valued e-coin is generated as follows:
1. The app generates N DSA key pairs {VCi/PCi}0≤i<N and N odd numbers {xi}0≤i<N
∈ [0, (q − 1)/2)].
2. Then, the app computes {Hi = H(PCi||gxi)}0≤i<N and blinds each Hi with a differ-
ent blinding factor ri. All the N blinded hash digests are sent to the server.
3. The server randomly chooses an index j ∈ [0, N− 1] and sends it to the app.
4. For each i 6= j, the app sends ri, xi and PCi to the server.
5. The server unblinds the N − 1 hash digests Hi and checks whether each Hi equals
H(PCi||gxi). It also verifies that each xi is odd and falls in the [0, (q− 1)/2)] range.
6. If all the checks are satisfied, the server blindly signs the remaining blinded hash
and returns the result to the app.
7. The app consequently obtains SignS(H(PCj||gxj)) .
1E-coins will usually be generated in batch so that just a single credit card payment for the overall
amount will be made.
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Remark. The difference between valued and no-valued e-coins is the parity of x.
Before issuing a no-valued e-coin, the system server must check that the corresponding x
is odd through the described cut-and-choose technique. E-coins are blindly signed so that
their issuance and spending cannot be related. Regardless of whether they are valued or
no-valued, for each issued e-coin the app stores a tuple {SignS(H(PC ||gx)), VC , x}.
Ticket generation
The driver has to issue a (valued) ticket for each of the time slots that compose the
expected parking period. To hide its duration, the app always requests the same amount,
R, of tickets (embracing the maximum allowed parking time). The tickets for slots in
which the driver expects to be parked are paid with valued e-coins. The remaining ones
are issued with no-valued ones so that no-valued dummy tickets are generated. This
procedure is run through an anonymous channel:
1. The app takes a (valued or no-valued) e-coin {SignS(H(PC ||gx)), VC , x} and spends
it by computing PC = g
VC and G = gx, and sending SignS(H(PC ||G)), PC , and G to
the server. Then, employing the secret key VC the app signs a bitstring representing
the current time and sends the resulting signature SignC(H(CurrentT ime)) to the
server.
2. The server verifies the RSA signature SignS(H(PC ||G)) using its public key PS, the
signature SignC(H(CurrentT ime)) under the e-coin public key PC and checks that
the e-coin has not been spent before.
3. The app determines the current time slot, Slot. Then it generates N random keys
{Ki}0≤i<N, and computes the set {IDSloti = HMACKi(Slot||License)}0≤i<N. It also




4. The app next computes the following N hash digests {H(Slot||IDSloti||G′i)}0≤i<N,
blinds each of them with a different blinding factor ri, and sends the blinded results
to the server.
5. The server randomly chooses an index j ∈ [0, N− 1] and sends it to the app.
6. For each i 6= j, the app sends ri, xri, Slot and IDSloti to the server.
7. The server unblinds the N− 1 hash digests Hi, computes G′i = G · gxri , and checks
whether each Hi is equal to H(Slot||IDSloti||G′i). It also verifies that each xri is
even and falls in the [0, (q − 1)/2)] range, and checks that Slot corresponds to a
future time slot.
8. If all the checks are satisfied, the server blindly signs the remaining blinded hash
and returns the result to the app. Also, the server stores:
{PC , G, SignS(H(PC ||G)), CurrentT ime, SignC(H(CurrentT ime))}.
After running this procedure, the app obtains the server signature on the ticket,
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namely SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)). If x′ ∈ [0, q − 1] is even, the ticket is valued. For




Remark. Whether or not a ticket is valued depends on the parity of x′. The system
server must check that x (in the e-coin) and x′ (on the ticket) have the same parity.
Since x′ = x+xrj , this is achieved by checking that xrj is even by means of the described
cut-and-choose technique.
Parking inspection
A parking officer approaches the car and queries its on-board device.
1. The on-board device, from its internal clock, determines the current time slot, Slot,
and sends it to the parking officer together with the car plate number, License, and
the signature SignD(H(Slot||License)).
2. The parking officer checks the received Slot and License values and sends them
together with SignD(H(Slot||License)) to the system server.
3. The server sends a push message to the app associated with License and waits for
a valid ticket (see the “Ticket request” procedure) for some time.
4. If the app does not properly respond to the request, the car is fined and its driver
receives a telematic notification.
Remark. Possession of SignD(H(Slot||License)) proves that the parking officer is
located close to the car.
Ticket request
When the app is requested to prove a pending inspection, the following procedure is run:
1. The app:
(a) Connects to the server and asks for the signature computed by the on-board
device (during the “Parking inspection” execution) over Slot and License.
(b) Verifies the signature SignD(H(Slot||License)).
(c) If the previous verification is successful, it sends the ticket SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)),
Slot, IDSlot, K, and x
′ to the server.
2. The system server:
(a) Checks the signature SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)) over Slot, IDSlot, and g
x′
under the server public key PS.
(b) Verifies that IDSlot equals HMACK(Slot||License).
(c) Checks that x′ ∈ [0, q − 1] is even and has not been previously revoked. In
such a case, the timestamp issued during the revocation, TimestampTSA(x
′),
is returned (see the “Ticket revocation” procedure).
3. If all the previous checks are satisfied, the parking officer is informed about the
validity of the ticket provided.
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If the app cannot provide a valid ticket, the driver is fined. If the driver paid for
parking but her phone is out of coverage, she will also be fined. In that case, the fine will
be canceled when the mobile device provides the ticket after reconnecting.
Ticket revocation
If the driver removes the car earlier than expected, she can revoke unused valued tickets
and recover the paid amount. The app connects to the server through an anonymous
channel, and, for each valued ticket:
1. The mobile app sends SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)), Slot, IDSlot and x
′.
2. The system server:
(a) Validates the signature SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)) over Slot, IDSlot, and g
x′
under the public key PS.
(b) Checks that Slot corresponds to a future time slot.
(c) Checks that x′ is even and has not been revoked before. In such a case, its
TimestampTSA(x
′) would be returned as proof.
3. If the ticket to be revoked is valid it requests the TSA to timestamp x′. It stores
x′ and TimestampTSA(x
′) in a database.
4. Finally, a new valued e-coin is issued and stored by the app wallet (by running the
“E-coin request” procedure).
Remark. Before revoking a ticket, the system server checks that it is valued (x′ is
even). The timestamp on x′ will serve, in case of dispute, as proof of its revoked status.
3.5 Privacy and security analysis
This section describes the privacy analysis and the security analysis against a malicious
driver.
3.5.1 Privacy analysis
When a driver parks, her app requests a constant amount of tickets through the “Ticket
generation” procedure. At this moment, the system server knows that a parking operation
is just being begun, but it must be unable to determine: (1) The plate number of the car;
(2) Which tickets are valued and which are not (so that the expected duration remains
secret).
When a parking officer checks the parking status of a car, the driver’s app is asked to
provide the ticket corresponding to the current time slot (“Ticket request” procedure).
At this moment, the exact time at which the provided ticket was issued should not be
revealed (so that the parking starting time remains secret).
These objectives are addressed in the following lemmas and theorem.
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Lemma 3.5.1. The information collected by the system server during the issuance of a
ticket (“Ticket generation” procedure) cannot be linked to the car license plate number.
Proof. When an e-coin is issued (“E-coin request” procedure), the server blindly signs it,
so that it obtains no information about it. Hence, when it is spent, it cannot be linked
to the moment it was generated or to the driver who requested it.
During the issuance of a ticket (“Ticket request” procedure), the relationship between
the ticket and a license plate number is established when computing each value IDSloti
(step 3) as HMACKi(Slot||License).
As a result of the cut-and-choose checks (step 6), the app sends xri , Slot, and IDSloti
to the server. The value of xri has been set at random so that there is no relation between
it and the car plate number. Slot is just an integer representing a time slot. Regarding
IDSloti , it has been computed as HMACKi(Slot||License) so that the relation between
IDSloti and License can only be determined if Ki is known. Since the app does not reveal
it, a brute force search would have to be performed which is assumed to be unfeasible.
Lemma 3.5.2. When a ticket is generated, the information collected by the system server
does not allow it to be determined whether or not the ticket is valued.
Proof. When a ticket is issued (“Ticket request” procedure), the app spends an e-coin by
sending SignS(H(PC ||G)), PC , and G (step 1), with G = gx. Whether or not the spent
e-coin is valued depends on the parity of x. Since the app does not reveal x, an attacker
would have to solve an instance of the discrete logarithm problem which is assumed to
be unfeasible.
Lemma 3.5.3. The information provided by a driver when a ticket is requested at a given
time slot cannot be linked to other time slots.
Proof. When a ticket is requested, the app sends SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx
′
)) with Slot,
IDSlot, K and x
′ to the system server.
The relationship between that ticket and the spent e-coin is given by gx
′
= G · gxr
(step 3), xr being an even number. Since xr is never revealed, the relationship mentioned
cannot be determined. Since tickets are generated independently, there is not any inform-
ation relating them. Hence, a ticket cannot be related either to the e-coin spent during
its issuance or to other tickets.
Theorem 3.5.4. The protocol fulfills the objectives defined in Section 3.3.3.
Proof. Lemma 3.5.1 states that the information collected by the server as a result of ticket
issuance cannot be linked to cars. Also, during a ticket request, the app only provides
a ticket if the server sends a message signed by the on-board device in the car. Such a
signed message can only be obtained if a parking officer is close to the car. These signed
messages include the current time slot, so that they cannot be employed to obtain tickets
for other slots. Hence, objective 1 is fulfilled.
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Regarding objective 2, when the app provides a ticket, that ticket only contains in-
formation about the requested time slot. Lemma 3.5.3 states that a ticket cannot be
related to other tickets. Also, Lemma 3.5.2 proves that the expected duration of a
parking operation is not leaked during the issuance of tickets. Hence, objective 2 is met.
Since the tickets issued for all the time slots composing the expected parking duration
are generated at the beginning of the parking operation, an Internet connection is only
required at that moment. If a parking inspection is performed while the app is out of
coverage, the app is allowed to send the ticket later. Hence, objective 3 is also met.
3.5.2 Security analysis
We first prove two basic properties of e-coin systems: unforgeability and security against
double spending. Next, we will deal with two attacks that a malicious driver might
attempt to perform.
Lemma 3.5.5. The proposed e-coin system is unforgeable and secure against double
spending.
Proof. An e-coin is only valid if its header digest, H(PC ||gx), has been signed by the
server. Since RSA signatures over hashed messages are unforgeable, so are the e-coins.
When the server accepts a payment, it stores the received e-coin in a database. Before
accepting an e-coin, the server checks that the received e-coin has not been spent before.
Generation of free-of-charge valued e-coins
A malicious driver could obtain free-of-charge valued e-coins by running a request for no-
valued ones but setting an even value for x (step 3.4.2 of the “E-coin request” procedure).
It would have to generate the set {xi}0≤i<N so that all its elements but one are odd. Then
it would need to be lucky so that the server, during the cut-and-choose checking, chooses
an index j corresponding to the only even number in the set. This attack succeeds with
probability 1/N.
The aforementioned attack can be avoided by blocking drivers that have failed the
cut-and-choose checking a certain amount of times.
Generation of valued tickets from no-valued e-coins
A driver could cheat, during the issuance of a ticket (“Ticket generation” procedure), by
obtaining a valued ticket after spending a no-valued e-coin. This attack requires that, at
Step 3, the driver generates the set {xri}0≤i<N so that all its elements but one are even,
and the server, during the cut-and-choose checking, chooses index j so that xrj is the odd
element. The probability of success for a given ticket is 1/N.
Since tickets are requested anonymously, the author of such an attack cannot be
identified and blocked. We propose that all the R tickets of a given parking operation be
3.6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 37
requested in batch so that the server sends all the challenges for the R cut-and-choose
checks at the same time. The server will only sign the requested tickets if all the cut-
and-choose checks are satisfied. If some of them fail, the tickets are not signed but the
employed e-coins are stored as being spent.
Under these conditions, the best strategy for an attacker consists of requesting all the
R tickets employing no-valued e-coins and cheating by trying to obtain just one valued
ticket. If the attacker succeeds, they will obtain one free valued ticket. Otherwise, they
will lose all the R no-valued e-coins. The probability of success is 1/N.
Since no-valued e-coins are spent, we can prevent the attack from being launched
massively by limiting their generation. We propose limiting the amount of no-valued
e-coins a driver can obtain so that for each valued e-coin, she can request only up to
R − 1 no-valued ones. This rate still allows users to make parking operations involving
just one time slot.
When the attacker succeeds, they obtain a ticket after spending R no-valued e-coins.
Since the probability of success is 1/N, they spend, on average, N · R no-valued e-coins
for each free ticket. Obtaining such an amount of no-valued e-coins needed a request for
N ·R
R−1 ≈ N valued e-coins which have been paid.
We conclude that the mentioned attack is possible but, on average, the attacker has
to pay for N valued e-coins, for each free ticket they obtain. Hence, the benefit for an
attacker is really negligible.
3.6 Experimental results
The two main actors of the system are the server and the mobile application. The mobile
application has been implemented in Java for Android devices. The big number library
java.math.BigInteger has been used to implement cryptographic operations involving
big integers. The server part has been developed under the .Net framework.
The feasibility of the system has been analyzed by testing the time-consuming proced-
ures, namely “E-coin request” and “Ticket generation” which are the procedures involving
cut-and-choose checks. The remaining procedures are rarely run or have a much lower
cost.
Our implementation employs 2048 bits cryptography for RSA/DSA signatures and
for all the operations involving hard-to-solve instances of the discrete logarithm problem.
Hash digests are computed by means of the SHA-256 function.
We have measured the average time to generate a valued e-coin, a no-valued e-coin
and a ticket for both a serial and a parallel implementation. As expected, mobile phones
and computers with more powerful CPU’s achieve better performances. We have also
observed that increasing the number of cores in parallel executions reduces the running
times. Memory requirements are negligible.
The cut-and-choose checks have been implemented with N = 100. For that reason,
the generation of no-valued e-coins and tickets is approximately 100 times harder than
the generation of valued e-coins.
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Table 3.2 shows the average running times (in milliseconds) obtained over two mobile
phones. Table 3.3 shows the running times at the server part.
Mobile phone Valued e-coin No-valued e-coin Ticket
BQ Model Cores GHz Serial Parallel Serial Parallel Serial Parallel
Aquaris U Lite 4 1.4 96 38 8998 3368 4646 1741
Aquaris U 8 1.4 92 35 8976 2248 4643 1164
Table 3.2: Mobile application running times (in milliseconds)
A 4-Core (8-Thread) server requires approximately 23 seconds to process a complete
parking transaction (involving the generation of 12 tickets). A more powerful computer,
namely a 36-Core (72-Thread) professional server, would reduce that time to around 2.5
seconds.
Server Valued e-coin No-valued e-coin Ticket
Processor Cores Threads GHz Serial Parallel Serial Parallel Serial Parallel
i3 2 4 3.40 125 42 10957 4148 11296 4277
i5 2 4 3.00 141 51 12372 5038 12661 5575
Athlon 4 4 2.80 157 42 15483 3925 15927 4266
i7 4 8 3.40 124 31 9001 1840 9297 1901
Table 3.3: Server running times (in milliseconds)
Reloading the electronic wallet with 12 e-coins, 6 of them being valued, took 13
seconds by the mobile phone and 12 seconds by the server. If 9 out of the 12 requested
coins are valued, the times reduce to 6 and 7 seconds, respectively. The overall time for
the issuance of 12 tickets is 37 seconds, 14 of them corresponding to operations computed
by the mobile phone while the remaining 23 are for computations by the server. The
app computations to request an e-coin could be pre-computed so that the delay in e-coin
issuance could be reduced to that at the server part.
Chapter 4
Reusability of e-tickets
This chapter was summarized in the scientific paper “A Construction for Providing
Reusability to Mobile Phone-Based e-Tickets” published in the IEEE Access journal
(2020) [BS20a]. The chapter proposes a construction that can be coupled to an existing
privacy-enabled e-ticketing system and endows it with the reusability property.
4.1 Introduction
In 1662, the first bus service was deployed in Paris with seven horse-drawn vehicles
running along regular routes [19b]. Since then, public transport systems have evolved
continuously. In the digital era, the worldwide deployment of the Internet together with
the popularization of mobile phones has set the basis for the development of advanced
technology for the management of public transport. As a very relevant example, we
mention the replacement of paper tickets with electronic ones (e-tickets).
From the data privacy point of view, an accurate analysis of data about the particular
way in which a person uses public transport allows personal information to be inferred.
So as to reduce such risks, companies should guarantee that the information they collect
is restricted to that strictly necessary to provide the service requested by their customers.
In the particular case of public transport e-tickets, the information managed by a ticket
issuer must not allow the way a specific citizen uses public transport to be traced.
4.1.1 E-ticket systems
A ticket is defined as “a small piece of paper or card given to someone, usually to show
that they have paid for an event, journey, or activity” [19a]. The definition for e-ticket is
“a ticket, usually for someone to travel on an aircraft, that is held on a computer and is
not printed on paper” [19a].
Many e-ticket systems [Fuj+99; Ver+08; QH05; Wan+04a; LQP09] consider a system
model composed of three actors in which users make use of a service offered by a service
provider through an e-ticket generated and managed by the ticket issuer. The service
provider and ticket issuer roles may be taken by the same entity.
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Table 4.1: Security and privacy requirements for e-ticket systems
Requirement Description
Guarantee
Integrity An e-ticket cannot be modified.
Authenticity A user must be able to validate that an e-ticket
has been issued through an authorized provider.
Non repudiation The service provider cannot deny having
issued an e-ticket.
Unforgeability Only authorized entities can issue a valid e-ticket.
Non overspending An e-ticket can only be used the number
of times stipulated at the time of its issuance.
Exculpability The service provider cannot falsely accuse
an honest user.
Consider
Identifiable e-ticket The identity of the e-ticket owner can be verified.
Anonymity
Fully-Revocable Anonymity of the ticket owner can be lifted.
Selective-Revocable The identity of the ticket owner can be revealed
in case of a malicious act.
Anonymous The identity of ticket owners cannot be
determined in any way.
Transferability An e-ticket can be transferred to another user.
Reusability An e-ticket can be used for several journeys.
There exist proposals in which e-tickets can be used anonymously [Arf+15; Rup+13;
Arf+14; AKJ10; AAA17; QH05; Ver+08; Wan+04a; Viv+12]. Some of them [Arf+15;
Arf+14; Ver+08; Wan+04a; Viv+12] include a trusted third-party responsible for man-
aging anonymity, whereas in other proposals [Rup+13; AKJ10; AAA17; QH05] anonym-
ity is managed by the ticket issuer itself. Additionally, there may exist the so-called
inspection authorities responsible for face-to-face checks [Mil+12].
Most proposals agree upon the existence of the following three main phases during
the lifetime of an e-ticket [Mut+12]:
1. Payment. The user pays for the required service.
2. Issuance. The ticket issuer, after receiving an appropriate payment, generates an
e-ticket that is provided to the user.
3. Validation. The service provider verifies the validity of the e-ticket provided before
granting the user with access to the service.
Some proposals consider payment and issuance as being part of the same phase [PC97;
SVW08; AKJ10; Rup+13], whereas others include an anonymity revocation procedure
which allows the identity of users who have acted fraudulently to be determined [Arf+15;
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Rup+13; Arf+14; AKJ10; AAA17; QH05; Ver+08]. An additional random inspection
process performed by inspection authorities is also considered in some proposals [Mil+12].
An e-ticket system must guarantee, or at least consider, the security and privacy
requirements enumerated in Table 4.1 [Mut+12]. Reusability allows an e-ticket to be used
for several journeys during a period of time. Throughout this chapter, the word journey
will usually refer to an elementary journey in which a user moves from a starting to a
destination station with no transfers. Reusability is especially useful in cities providing
several means of transport such as bus, tram, train, or underground. Citizens and tourists
benefit from great flexibility to plan their journeys inside the city.
The system must allow it to be checked that an e-ticket has not expired, or that
its maximum amount of elementary journeys has not been exceeded. In both cases,
fraudulent uses must be detectable [Mut+12].
4.2 Related work
There are plenty of proposals for e-ticket systems in the literature. Most of them do
not consider the possibility of carrying out transfers [Mil+12; PC97; Han+17; Arf+15;
Rup+13; KLG13; SVW08; AKJ10; Viv+11; AAA17], but implement mechanisms al-
lowing clients to purchase and validate e-tickets anonymously. Specifically, the propos-
als [Viv+11; AAA17; SVW08] make use of pseudonyms so that the system cannot link
an e-ticket to the identity of the user who acquired it. If pseudonyms are used, the real
identity information is not included in the ticket, only its pseudonym. To avoid user trace-
ability, pseudonyms should be updated regularly. Other proposals provide anonymity by
means of alternative techniques [Arf+15; Rup+13; AKJ10; PC97; Han+17; KLG13]. For
example, in an attribute-based credentials scheme, a user can prove that he has obtained
a credential without revealing any additional information.
In case of fraudulent behavior, some proposals allow anonymity revocation [Arf+15;
Rup+13; AKJ10; AAA17]. Anonymity has to be revocable in order to identify fraudulent
users while honest ones must remain anonymous. The real identity of fraudulent users is
usually revealed by a trusted third party.
The proposal in [Mil+12] is the only one including the possibility of carrying out
random inspections. An inspector can require a user to prove that she is the owner of the
inspected e-ticket. At this moment the system is able to link the identity of the user to
the e-ticket and obtain all the information about her journey (like the starting station).
There exist a few proposals allowing transfers so that the rider of a public transport
vehicle can continue the trip on another bus or train [Hey+06; QH05; Viv+12]. In
particular [QH05; Viv+12] include revocable anonymity. They were both designed to be
implemented on mobile devices. Some proposals limit the amount of transfers, whereas
others allow an unlimited amount within a certain period of time.
Systems limiting the number of transfers usually implement a mechanism in which an
e-ticket includes a hash chain whose size depends on the maximum number of transfers
allowed. In this way, if T journeys are allowed, a T-element hash chain {chaink}1≤k≤T is
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Table 4.2: Summary related work proposals
Proposal Allow Expiration Limited Anonymity Anonymity Allow
transfers time transfers Pseudonym Others revocable inspections
[Mil+12] 7 7 7 3 7 3
[PC97] 7 7 7 3 7 7
[Han+17] 7 7 7 3 7 7
[Arf+15] 7 7 7 3 3 7
[Rup+13] 7 7 7 3 3 7
[KLG13] 7 7 7 3 7 7
[SVW08] 7 7 7 3 7 7
[AKJ10] 7 7 7 3 3 7
[Viv+11] 7 7 7 3 7 7
[AAA17] 7 7 7 3 3 7
[Hey+06] 3 3 7 3 3 7
[QH05] 3 3 3 3 3 7
[Viv+12] 3 3 3 3 3 7
[BS20a] 3 3 3 Determined by the underlying e-ticket system 3
generated so that chaink−1 = H(chaink), with chainT being a random number. When
beginning the i-th journey, the user is asked to provide chaini.
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the properties fulfilled by the cited previous proposals.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no previous proposal allowing a limited amount
of transfers includes the possibility of carrying out random inspections. In such a case,
when a user identifies herself and proves that she is the owner of the e-ticket, the system
is able to link her identity to all the journeys made with the inspected ticket. The system
should only be able to determine whether the inspected user is authorized to make the
current journey with the ticket provided.
4.3 System model
The system model (Figure 4.1) is composed of the following actors:
1. Mobile application or app. It runs on the mobile phone of public transport
users. It is used for e-ticket purchase and validation. Each time a user enters a
means of transport (after an e-ticket validation or a transfer), the mobile phone is
to be placed close to a hardware device which will grant access. When a user leaves,
a similar operation is necessary to obtain the data needed for the next journey in
case a transfer is to be carried out. If a random inspection takes place, the user will
use the app to demonstrate the validity of her ticket. The app also manages the
so-called deposit token, employed to force all users to run the “Get-out” procedure
at the end of each journey, even when they are not going to do a transfer.
2. System server. This is a central server which manages all the information of
the e-ticket system. It is contacted by the users’ app during the purchase and
validation of e-tickets. It is also accessed by transport system proximity devices
4.4. SYSTEM PROPOSAL 43
when users run the “Get-in” and “Get-out” procedures, including the management
of deposit tokens. Inspectors also access it when performing random inspections. It
incorporates a database to store data and avoid double spending frauds.
3. Transport system devices. Our proposal requires the transport system provider
to install a proximity reading device at each entrance and exit.
• An entrance device is accessed by users when entering a transport system.
It is responsible for validating whether the data provided by a user (a travel
token) allow her to enter the transport system. In that case, it grants access to
the user and provides her with data (an inspection token) that will be requested
if an inspection takes place.
• An exit device is accessed by users when leaving a transport system. This
access is mandatory for all users, even if they are not going to do a transfer.
If not done, the user loses her deposit token.
Both devices need permanent communication with the system server.
4. Inspector. He is responsible for carrying out random controls within the transport
system. He verifies that users are traveling with a valid inspection token. The
inspector uses a mobile device to that end.
Figure 4.1: System model
4.4 System proposal
4.4.1 System overview
Our proposal is designed as a plug-in to be coupled to an existing e-ticket system. The
underlying e-ticket system has its own purchase and anonymity policies. When a user
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starts a new journey (maybe composed of several stages with the corresponding transfers),
she must activate an available e-ticket on the underlying system. Just after that, the
“Travel token chain generation” procedure is run. During its execution, the plug-in
generates a travel token chain whose length equals the maximum amount of journey
stages allowed per e-ticket. When this procedure concludes, the first travel token of the
chain is ready to be used. These chained travel tokens are to be presented sequentially
at the beginning of each elementary journey. Figure 4.2 is an abstract graphic of our
proposal.
Just before gaining access to a transport system vehicle or platform, the user performs
a “Get-in” procedure during which she is required to hold her mobile phone near to an
entrance control device and provide a travel token via some proximity communication
system. The entrance device, by querying the central system server, determines whether
the travel token provided is ready to be used and checks that it has not been used before. If
the validation is correct, the entrance device will generate, and send to the mobile device,
an inspection token which includes a trip identifier. A trip identifier is a random value
which uniquely identifies each trip carried out by the transport system. The inspection
token will be required in case of inspection.
When a user leaves a platform or vehicle, she runs the “Get-out” procedure. She must
then hold her mobile phone close to an exit device in order to obtain her next travel token
ready to be used for the next stage of the journey.
Figure 4.2: Abstract graphic
During a “Random inspection”, the user must provide the inspection token she ob-
tained when performing the “Get-in” procedure. That inspection token is linked to some
piece of personal information, such as her passport number or the hash digest of a personal
picture, which will be checked by the inspector.
To avoid fraudulent use, our system requires all users to perform the “Get-out” pro-
cedure at the end of each stage of the journey, even when they are not going to do a
transfer. This is achieved by making users provide a deposit token during the execution
of the “Get-in” procedure and obtaining a new one free of charge when performing the
corresponding “Get-out” procedure. If this is not done, the user loses her deposit and
will have to pay for a new one. The first deposit token of each user is provided free of
charge.
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4.4.2 Preliminary set-up procedures
Next we describe two procedures related to system configuration. The first one, “Server
set-up”, is run by the ticket issuer to create and set the cryptographic keys and constants
required for the system to run. The other one, “Application set-up”, is run by users when
installing the system app in their mobile devices.
Server set-up
Before deploying the system, the ticket issuer:
1. Creates the following cryptographic keys:
• “Get-in” blind signature (Section 2.5) key pair: PSin/VSin .
• “Get-out” blind signature key pair: PSout/VSout .
• “Deposit” blind signature key pair: PSd/VSd .
• “User token” blind signature key pair: PSu/VSu .
• “Trip” partially blind signature (Section 2.6) key pair: PSt/VSt .
The public keys created are: PSin , PSout , PSd , PSu , PSt .
The private keys created are: VSin , VSout , VSd , VSu , VSt .
2. Creates a tuple of set-up parameters for a commitment-scheme allowing range zero-
knowledge proofs (Section 2.8).
3. Sets and stores the following constants:
• T ≡ Maximum amount of journeys allowed per e-ticket.
• TIME ACTIVE ≡ Amount of minutes for which an e-ticket is valid after its
activation.
• TTend ≡ A hash on random string.
• N ≡ Parameter which tunes the security level of the cut-and-choose checking
performed during the generation of travel token chains.
The private keys VSin , VSout , VSd , VSu , VSt must be kept secret by the ticket issuer which
will make them available only to the system server. The remaining parameters are made
public to all the actors.
Application set-up
A user has to install the application of the underlying e-ticket system together with the
extension plug-in on her mobile phone. Then, she must introduce all the information
required by the underlying e-ticket system (credit card, etc). After that, the extension
plug-in will request some information that identifies her unequivocally (like a picture
or her passport number) which will be stored in the IDuser object in her phone. This
information must allow an inspector to verify her identity.
The app obtains a deposit token free of charge by running the procedure described in
Section 4.4.4.
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4.4.3 Travel token chain
After a ticket is activated, the system generates a chain composed of T chained travel
tokens, {TTi}0≤i<T, T being the maximum amount of journeys (with the corresponding
transfers) that can be made with each e-ticket. Each travel token in a given chain is
assigned the same expiration time E and is linked to the same masked user identity
IDmasked (computed as HMACKu(IDuser) with Ku being a secret key).
Structure of a travel token
A travel token (Figure 4.3) is a tuple containing several public parameters computed from
a set of secret ones. The private parameters are generated and kept secret by the app.
The public ones compose the travel token object, TTi.
Figure 4.3: The i-th travel token
• Private parameters of TTi:
– Ki: secret key used to re-mask the masked user identity.
– ui: secret value for blinding the re-masked user identity.
– ci: secret value for committing to the expiration time.
– ti: secret value for blinding the link to the next travel token of the chain.
• Public parameters of TTi:
– Ui: blinded re-masked user identity, namely Blindui(H(HMACKi(IDmasked)), PSu).
– Ci: commitment to the expiration time E, namely Commitci(E).
– NextTTi: blinded link to the next travel token of the chain, namely Blindti(H(TTi+1), PSin).
• The chain is concluded by setting TTT = TTend.
A travel token TTi is said to be ready for use when it is accompanied by two digital
signatures under the “Get-in” and “Get-out” server key pairs, namely SignSin(H(TTi))
and SignSout(H(TTi)). A ready for use travel token allows a user to obtain access to a
transport system.
Generation of a travel token chain
A travel token chain (Figure 4.4) is generated by means of the following procedure which
takes as input and expiration time E and a masked user identity IDmasked:
1. Set i = T− 1
2. While i ≥ 0 (generate TTi):
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• Generate Ki, ui, ci, and ti at random and store them secretly.
• Set Ui = Blindui(H(HMACKi(IDmasked)), PSu).
• Compute Ci = Commitci(E).
• Compute NextTTi:
– if i < T− 1 then
NextTTi = Blindti(H(TTi+1), PSin).
– if i = T− 1 then
NextTTi = Blindti(H(TTend), PSin).
• Pack Ui, Ci and NextTTi into a tuple and name it TTi.
• Let i = i− 1.
3. The resulting travel token chain is represented as a set C = {TT0, . . . , TTT−1}.
Figure 4.4: Travel token chain
Validation of a travel token chain
GivenH(TT0), the correct composition of a travel token chain can be checked by requiring
its generator to provide the input parameters E and IDmasked together with all of its
private and public parameters. The verifier can then repeat the construction process
from TTT−1 down to TT0 and finally check that the hash of the obtained token TT0
matches H(TT0).
4.4.4 Travel-related procedures
The following section describes the protocols executed by users while traveling in public
transport.
Deposit token generation
When a user enters a transport system, she has to provide a deposit token. Later, when
she leaves, she receives a new one which is generated by means of the process described
in this section. As a result of this process, the user obtains a new deposit token whose
structure is that of an anonymous e-coin generated through Chaum’s system [Cha83].
A deposit token is generated free of charge the first time a user registers with the
system or when obtained during the “Get-out” process. If a user loses her deposit token,
probably because she does not run the “Get-out” procedure at the end of a journey, she
will be charged to obtain a new one.
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A deposit token is generated as follows:
1. If necessary, the app performs a credit card payment for the cost of a deposit token.
2. The app generates a random value deposit, hashes and blinds it with a random
blinding factor d for server’s deposit key, Blindd(H(deposit), PSd), and sends the
resulting value to the server.
3. The server blindly signs the value received and returns the resulting blinded signa-
ture to the app.
4. The app unblinds the blinded signature received, obtaining a signature from the
server on H(deposit), namely SignSd(H(deposit)).
5. Finally, the app stores the resulting deposit token tuple {deposit, SignSd(H(deposit))}.
When the previous procedure is executed during a “Get-out” procedure (step 1 is
skipped), the identity of the user is not revealed. When a payment is made, anonymity
is not required since the identity of the user can be obtained from the payment method
data. This case of usage shall not be applied to users acting as required.
E-ticket purchase
The user pays for and obtains e-tickets from the underlying e-ticket system. The under-
lying e-ticket system is required to guarantee that the purchased e-tickets can later be
activated anonymously.
E-Ticket activation
When a user is about to start a journey (which may include several transfers), her app
contacts the ticket issuer server and activates an e-ticket from the underlying system.
After a successful activation, the plug-in module runs the following “Travel token chain
generation” procedure.
Travel token chain generation. This procedure generates a chain composed of T travel
tokens. Its correct composition is checked by means of a cut-and-choose technique tuned
with parameter N.
1. The app sets the expiration time to E = CurrentT ime+ TIME ACTIVE.
2. The app takes IDuser and computes a set of N masked identities {IDmaskedk =
HMACKUk (IDuser)}0≤k<N from N different keys KUk .
3. Using the procedure in Section 4.4.3, the app generates N travel token chains
{Ck}0≤k<N providing E and IDmaskedk as input, respectively.
4. The app, for each chain Ck = {TT k0 , . . . , TT kT−1}, hashes its first travel token, TT k0 ,
and blinds the resulting digest under a random blinding factor rk generating a set
of blinded digests {Bk = Blindrk(H(TT k0 ), PSin)}0≤k<N. All these blinded values are
sent to the server.
5. The server chooses a random j ∈ [0, N− 1] and sends it to the app.
6. The app, for each k 6= j, sends the blinding factor rk to the server together with all
the information required to check the correct composition of chain Ck.
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7. For each k 6= j, the server unblinds the received hash and verifies each chain Ck
under H(TT k0 ), E and IDmaskedk together with all the additional parameters as
described in Section 4.4.3.
8. If all the validations are satisfied, the server blindly signs Bj under its “Get-in” key
pair so that the app is able to obtain SignSin(H(TT
j
0 )).
9. Next, the app generates r′j at random and computes Blindr′j(H(TT
j
0 ), PSout) which
is sent to the server which will blindly sign it under its “Get-out” key pair. From
the result, the app obtains the signature SignSout(H(TT
j
0 )).
10. Finally, the app keeps a chain of travel tokens Cj = {TT j0 , . . . , TT
j
T−1}, whose first
token, TT j0 has been blindly signed by the server under the “Get-in” and “Get-out”
key pairs. Hence, this first travel token is ready for use.
If any check fails, the procedure of the underlying e-ticket system applied in case
of fraudulent behaviour is run. This may include anonymity revocation and fining the
user. Although the probability of cheating cannot be made arbitrarily small (making
1/N negligible would require a rather large value for N which has a direct impact on the
running time of the protocol), users will be discouraged from cheating if the amount of
the fine is large enough.
The chain generation process ensures that all the travel tokens of a chain are linked
to the same IDuser object so that they cannot be shared among different users. The user
linked to the travel tokens of the chain shall not necessarily be the one who acquired the
e-tickets. This assumes that the underlying e-tickets are transferable.
Get-in
When a user is about to begin a new journey (after making a transfer or after the
activation of an e-ticket), she holds her mobile phone near to a device located at the
entrance control system. Both devices communicate through a proximity communication
system. If the user provides a ready to be used travel token (signed under both the “Get-
in” and “Get-out” key pairs) and a valid deposit token, she will be allowed to enter. The
transport system, for each trip, generates a unique identifier IDtrip. The user receives an
inspection token that will be required in case of inspection.
The user is required to leave a deposit token. In this way, she will be forced to run
the “Get-out” process at the end of her journey so as to obtain a new one. If not done,
she will lose it and will have to pay for a new one.
1. The app transmits its deposit token, namely {deposit, SignSd(H(deposit))}.
2. The entrance device verifies the digital signature over H(deposit) and asks the
system server to check it has not been used before. If all these checks are satisfied,
the server stores H(deposit) in a database to record it as already used.
3. The app transmits a ready to be used travel token TTi (accompanied with SignSin(H(TTi))
and SignSout(H(TTi))) to the entrance device.
4. The entrance device verifies both digital signatures and checks that TTi 6= TTend.
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5. The entrance device computes the digest H(TTi) and sends it to the system server
to verify that it has not been used before. If not used before, the server stores
H(TTi) together with CurrentT ime to record it as already used.
6. The app proves in zero-knowledge to the entrance device that the commitment Ci
extracted from TTi contains an expiration time that is still valid by proving that
it falls between CurrentT ime and CurrentT ime + TIME ACTIVE. This is done by
means of the techniques described in Section 2.8.
7. The entrance device extracts NextTTi from TTi and asks the server to sign it with
the “Get-in” key, so that the app blindly obtains a signature SignSin(H(TTi+1)).
8. The entrance device extracts Ui from TTi and asks the server to sign it with the user-
token key, so that the app blindly obtains Utoken = SignSu(H(HMACKi(IDmasked))).
9. The user asks, via the entrance device, the server to compute a partially blind
signature on Utoken with IDtrip as agreed information. The resulting signature
Utrip = PartialSignSt(H(Utoken),H(IDtrip)) is obtained by the app.
10. Finally, the inspection token is stored by the app as the tuple {Utoken, IDtrip, Utrip}.
Get-out
When a user has finished a journey and is about to leave the transport system, she has to
hold her mobile phone close to the corresponding exit device. As a result of this protocol,
the user obtains her next travel token ready to be used (she receives a second signature
under the “Get-out” key pair) and a new free of charge deposit token to be used in her
next journey. She is also asked to present her inspection token so as to record it as no
longer valid.
If this protocol is not performed, the user does not obtain a deposit token and will
have to pay for a new one so as to use the public transport again in the future.
1. The app hashes and blinds, with a random number t, the next travel token TTi+1.
Then it sends the result, Blindt(H(TTi+1), PSout), to the exit device.
2. The exit device asks the system server to sign the received blinded message under
the “Get-out” key pair so that the app obtains SignSout(H(TTi+1)).
3. The app obtains a free deposit token as follows:
(a) The app sends the current inspection token {Utoken, IDtrip, Utrip} to the exit
device together with HMACKi(IDmasked).
(b) The exit device checks IDtrip corresponds to the current trip of the transport
system.
(c) The exit device, in collaboration with the system server, verifies that neither
Utoken nor Utrip have been received before. It also verifies that Utoken is a valid
signature on H(HMACKi(IDmasked)). It finally verifies that Utrip is a partial
signature PartialSignSt(H(Utoken),H(IDtrip)).
(d) By running the procedure in Section 4.4.4, the app obtains a new deposit token
free of charge, {deposit, SignSd(H(deposit))}.
(e) The system server stores {Utoken, Utrip} so as to record them as no longer valid.
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Random inspection
During an inspection, an inspector determines if a user has a valid inspection token for
the current public transport trip.
1. The app sends {IDuser, IDtrip, Utoken, Utrip, Ku, K} to the inspector via a short-
range communication system.
2. The inspector:
(a) Checks that the data in IDuser correspond to the person in front of him (it
may be a picture or her passport number).
(b) Checks that IDtrip corresponds to the current trip.
(c) Checks that neither Utoken nor Utrip have been provided in a previous inspection
and have not been marked as no longer valid.
(d) Computes IDmasked = HMACKu(IDuser), and checks that Utoken is a valid
signature SignSu(H(HMACK(IDmasked))).
(e) Checks that Utrip is a valid partial signature PartialSignSt(H(Utoken),H(IDtrip)).
3. The inspector sends both Utoken and Utrip to the server so as to record them as no
long valid.
If any of these checks fail, the user will be fined according to the established regula-
tions. After being inspected, the user obtains a new inspection token so as to avoid her
next execution of the “Get-out” process being linked to the inspection. This is done as
follows:
1. The app generates a random key K ′, a random blinding factor u′, and computes
U ′ = Blindu′(H(HMACK′(IDmasked))), PSu) which is sent, via the inspector’s device,
to the server.
2. The server blindly signs U ′ and returns, via the inspector’s device, the result to the
app so that it can obtain U ′token = SignSu(H(HMACK′(IDmasked))).
3. Next, the app asks, via the inspector’s device, the server to compute a partially blind
signature over U ′token with IDtrip as agreed information. The resulting signature
U ′trip = PartialSignSt(U
′
token, IDtrip) is obtained by the app.
4. Finally, the app stores the new inspection token as the tuple {U ′token, IDtrip, U ′trip}.
4.5 Privacy objectives and privacy analysis
4.5.1 Privacy objectives
The privacy goals to be achieved by our proposal are listed below:
1. While traveling, the interactions with the system (except for those arising from an
inspection carried out by an inspector) performed by a user are anonymous and
unlinkable.
2. While traveling, a user is only required to identify herself if requested by an in-
spector. In such a case, the only information obtained by the system is a boolean
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indicating whether the identified user is allowed to make the current journey.
Privacy objective 1 implies that the moments a user enters and leaves a transport
system cannot be related. Also, the system cannot link the different journeys made by a
user with one or several e-tickets.
Privacy objective 2 determines that, as a result of an inspection, the system can only
obtain information inherent in the inspection itself. That is, it can associate a user with
a specific time and place. Any additional information, like the starting and end stations,
cannot be deduced.
4.5.2 Privacy analysis
We next present a set of lemmas which are the basis for proving Theorem 4.5.5.
Lemma 4.5.1. During an execution of the “Travel token chain generation” procedure,
the server obtains no information allowing it to identify the generated chain.
Proof. A travel token chain is generated through a cut-and-choose protocol in which the
app first generates N blinded chains. After that, the server asks the app to reveal all the
parameters used in the generation of N− 1 of them. Finally, the first travel token of the
remaining chain is blindly signed by the server. We next justify that the server obtains
no information, allowing it to identify the remaining chain.
All the random parameters generated during the creation of the N chains are chosen
independently among them so that revealing the parameters of N − 1 chains does not
provide any information about the parameters used to create the remaining one.
The IDuser object is masked with a different random key before its inclusion in each
chain (set {IDmaskedk}0≤k<N). These masked values are revealed for N − 1 of the chains,
but their knowledge does not provide any information about the remaining one, since the
random keys are kept secret.
The N chains share the same expiration time E which is revealed during the cut-and-
choose checks. Nevertheless, E is included in the travel tokens TTi through commitments
Ci = Commitci(E). In all future uses of these tokens, the non-expiration of a travel token
is proven by means of zero-knowledge proofs so that the exact value for E is never
revealed. Hence, the remaining chain cannot be identified from E.
Finally, the only access the server has to the remaining chain is produced when it is
asked to blindly sign its first travel token. A blind signature protocol guarantees that the
signing party obtains no information about the signed data. Hence, the server obtains
no information about the signed token.
Lemma 4.5.2. The travel tokens of a chain cannot be linked among them by the server.
Proof. A travel token TTi is a tuple composed of three parameters, namely Ui, Ci, and
NextTTi.
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Both Ui and NextTTi are blinded values generated from random blinding factors so
that they cannot be related to the actual values blinded inside them or to the resulting
signatures. Hence, they provide no information at all as long as the blinding factors are
kept secret by the app.
The expiration time, E, committed in Ci is shared among all the travel tokens of a
chain. However, each Ci is generated from a different and random ci so that linking travel
tokens from these commitments is computationally unfeasible. The non-expiration of a
travel token is proven through zero-knowledge proofs so that the actual value E is not
revealed.
Lemma 4.5.3. When an inspection token is generated, the server only obtains inform-
ation about its IDtrip component.
Proof. An inspection token is a tuple {Utoken, IDtrip, Utrip}. The Utoken component is
obtained by the app as a blind signature computed by the system server. Hence, the
server obtains no information about it.
Regarding Utrip, it is obtained by the app as a partially blind signature over Utoken
with IDtrip as agreed information. Hence, the server only learns IDtrip.
Lemma 4.5.4. After a “Random inspection”, the “Get-in” and “Get-out” procedures of
the inspected journey cannot be determined.
Proof. During an inspection, the app sends the tuple {IDuser, Utoken, IDtrip, Utrip, Ku, K}
to the inspector.
The link between an inspection token and the travel token TTi provided for its gen-
eration is given by Utoken being a signature over the value blinded in the Ui component
of TTi. Since Ui is a blinded value, it cannot be related to the (unblinded) signature
obtained from it. Hence, an inspection token provided during an inspection cannot be
related to the execution of the “Get-in” process in which it was generated.
At the end of an inspection, a new inspection token is generated by the user. When
it is provided during an execution of the “Get-out” procedure, it will not be linkable to
the current inspection.
Theorem 4.5.5. The proposed system meets the design objectives 1 and 2 (user’s mobility
profiles cannot be created).
Proof. When a user activates an e-ticket of the underlying system, a chain of travel tokens
is created. From Lemma 4.5.1, the server obtains no information allowing it to identify
that chain; hence, the “e-Ticket activation” operation remains anonymous and unlinkable.
After that, each time the user runs a “Get-in” procedure, she provides a travel token
of that chain. From Lemma 4.5.2, the tokens of a chain cannot be related among them
so that the executions of the “Get-in” process using tokens of the same chain cannot be
related among them.
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When running a “Get-in” process, the user also obtains an inspection token, from
which, according to Lemma 4.5.3, the server obtains no information but its IDtrip com-
ponent. Hence, the server obtains no information at all about the user from the “Get-in”
process.
When running a “Get-out” process, the user provides her inspection token so as to
mark it as no longer valid. Since the keys used to mask user’s identity in that token
are not revealed, the server cannot link that token to the identity of the user. From
Lemma 4.5.3, the provided inspection token cannot be linked to any personal data of the
user.
When a random inspection takes place, the user is asked to provide her inspection
token and all the data allowing it to be linked to her identity. The inspector obtains
user’s identity but, according to Lemma 4.5.4, her inspection token cannot be linked to
the executions of the “Get-in” and “Get-out” procedures of that journey. In this way,
the only information obtained is the presence of the inspected user at the place where
the inspection has taken place.
4.6 Experimental results
The actors considered in our experiments are: the server, the entrance devices, the exit
devices, and the app. To simplify, we have considered the entrance and exit devices to be
part of the system server.
Prototypes have been implemented in Java. The app has been developed specifically
for the Android operating system. The java.math.BigInteger library has been used to
implement cryptographic operations involving big integers.
The feasibility of the system has been analyzed from the two most critical use cases.
Namely, “e-Ticket activation” (Section 4.4.4) which performs a cut-and-choose check
involving strong computations, and the “Get-in” process (Section 4.4.4) which should
respond with a minimum delay. Both procedures are executed between the app and the
system server.
Our experiments employ 2048 bit cryptography for RSA blind signatures and for all
the operations involving hard-to-solve instances of the discrete logarithm problem. Hash
digests are computed by means of the SHA-256 function.
The cut-and-choose check run during “e-Ticket activation” has been tuned to N = 100
so that the probability of cheating is reduced to 1% (generation of a fraudulent chain
involves, on average, the payment of 99 fines). The “Travel token chain generation”
procedure has been executed with parameter T = 3 (maximum amount of journeys which
can be made with a single e-ticket). All the implemented processes require intensive CPU
usage with negligible memory requirements.
Table 4.3 shows the average running times for the app. Two variants of the “e-Ticket
activation” procedure have been tested. A real-time variant in which all the computations
are performed during the protocol execution, and a pre-computed variant in which values
for IDmasked, Ui, and NextTTT−1 have been computed in advance. Both variants have
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Table 4.3: Mobile application running times (in milliseconds).
Mobile phone e-Ticket activation Get-in
BQ Model Cores GHz Real-time Pre-computed Serial
Aquaris U Lite 4 1.4 21528 8952 880
Aquaris U 8 1.4 16414 4467 877
been implemented taking advantage of parallel computing. We can observe that pre-
computations provide a 60%-75% time reduction. The “Get-in” protocol of the app
has been implemented in serial mode (it cannot benefit from either pre-computations or
parallel processing). Running the “Get-in” procedure took less than one second in the
two devices on which it was tested.
Table 4.4: System server running times (in milliseconds).
System server e-Ticket activation Get-in
Processor Cores Threads GHz Serial Parallel Serial Parallel
Intel i5-4310 2 4 3.00 17163 7719 320 148
AMD Athlon 4 4 2.80 25867 7497 487 126
Intel i7-6700 4 8 3.40 11812 2814 219 56
Intel i7-8700 6 12 3.20 10103 1615 184 30
Table 4.4 shows the average running times of the server. Both the “e-Ticket ac-
tivation” and the “Get-in” procedure have been executed in serial and in parallel. In
the parallel version, multiple instances of the “e-Ticket activation” procedure have been
executed concurrently.
The experiments show that the app can be deployed on current mobile phones, since
tickets can be activated in around 4.5 seconds, whereas a “Get-in” procedure can be
completed in less than one second. The computer load at the server part must be bal-
anced among several computers so as to manage all the concurrent requests received in
a large city. A professional 36-Core (72-Thread) computer could manage three “e-Ticket
activation” requests per second.




This chapter presents a system summarized in the scientific paper “An efficient privacy-
preserving pay-by-phone system for regulated parking areas” which was published in the
International Journal of Information Security (2020) [BS20b]. It aims to reduce the
computational cost of proposal [BS19] described in Chapter 3.
5.1 Introduction
Traditionally, when parking in regulated areas, drivers had to purchase a ticket from a
machine and display it on the dashboard of the car.
Smartphones can currently run applications that allow these payments to be made
much easier [20c; 20d; 20e; 20f; 20j; 20h; 20a; 20i]. Upon parking, the driver introduces
the license plate number of the car, the expected parking duration, and the parking area.
A digital payment is then performed using a credit card or deducted from a pre-paid
balance. These applications provide several advantages: they avoid the use of paper and
eliminate the need to move to a pay station or carry coins. They also allow the parking
time to be extended without returning to the car, while some of them even refund the
money corresponding to unused time if the car is removed earlier than expected.
In order to avoid the automatic tracking of vehicles, the payment status of a car
should not be checkable unless a parking officer is located close to the parked car.
So as to obtain the desired privacy, it is necessary to use and combine cryptographic
tools and protocols. These cryptographic tools and protocols may require elevated com-
puting resources. When the time spent by the protocols is too high for the solution to
be deployed, the proposed system has to be optimized or redesigned.
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5.2 Related work
Several pay-by-phone parking systems have been deployed in many cities [20c; 20d; 20e;
20f; 20j; 20h; 20a; 20i] 1. They work properly and make payments easy for drivers. Nev-
ertheless, they collect very complete and linkable (from car plate numbers) information
about all the parking transactions. Hence, parking profiles can easily be built from their
data if stolen or leaked by an internal attacker.
There exist academic proposals addressing the privacy of drivers by means of cryp-
tographic protocols [Pér15; GMS17; BS19]. All these proposals share a similar system
model and user experience. They all implement a paradigm in which drivers acquire
pre-paid credit in the form of anonymous e-coins. Parking transactions are then paid by
e-coins. Drivers are required to incorporate an on-board RFID device into cars which is
queried by parking officers when an inspection takes place.
In [GMS17] the mobile application of drivers performs successive micro-payments for
short-time intervals while their cars are parked. These payments cannot be linked among
them, and can only be related to the car as a result of an inspection carried out by an
officer. Its main disadvantage comes from the fact that if some of the micro-payments
could not be made due to a lack of coverage or low battery, the driver may be fined.
Hence, that system requires drivers’ devices to be permanently connected. The previous
issue is addressed in [BS19]. Upon parking, the driver pays in advance for a constant
amount of time intervals. So as to mask the expected duration of parking, e-coins can be
valued or no-valued. Valued e-coins are used to pay for those intervals in which the driver
expects to be parked, while the remaining ones are paid with no-valued e-coins. As a
result of an inspection, the system just obtains a boolean indicating whether a payment
with a valued e-coin was made for the current time interval.
In our opinion, the proposal [BS19] described in Chapter 3 is the most complete
privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system. However, the security of some of its
procedures holds on cut-and-choose checks tuned with a security parameter N. They re-
duce the probability of cheating to 1/N at the expense of increasing the computational cost
linearly with N. Hence, only moderately small probabilities of cheating can be attained
at a reasonable cost.
The proposal [BS19] uses the cut-and-choose technique at two moments: during the
generation of no-valued e-coins and at the beginning of a parking transaction. No-valued
e-coins can be generated in a background batch procedure. However, ticket generation
must be done in real time so that the time spent by this process is as short as possible.
5.3 Cut-and-choose technique
A blind signature protocol (Section 2.5) ensures that the signer does not learn anything
about the signed message. There are, however, some situations in which the signer should
1A detailed review of related work on privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking systems can be found
in Section 3.2.
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check that the message he is going to sign satisfies some property. Such checking may be
done by means of the cut-and-choose technique [Sch96].
Next, we show a simple example in which the signer Bob wants to verify that the
message he is going to blindly sign really contains an odd random number:
1. Alice generates N messages which are blinded, each with a different blinding factor.
Then she sends the N blinded documents to Bob.
2. Bob chooses N− 1 documents at random and asks Alice to send the blinding factor
for each of the selected documents.
3. Alice sends the appropriate blinding factors.
4. Bob unblinds the chosen N − 1 documents and checks that each of them contains
an odd number.
5. Bob blindly signs the remaining document and sends the result to Alice.
6. Alice unblinds the received signature.
The main drawback of this technique lies in the fact that it requires the generation
and verification of N-1 additional messages. Their generation and verification can be
computationally high especially if such checks involve modular computations over big
integers. The probability of fraud is (1/N), whereas the computational cost grows linearly
with N.
5.4 System and adversary models
Like in [GMS17] and [BS19] the current proposal divides the time into short-duration
intervals (e.g. 5 or 10 minutes) and drivers (micro)pay for those slots during which
their cars are parked. Each time slot is represented as a unique integer indicating, for
instance, the amount of intervals elapsed since the beginning of year 2000 (or any other
chosen reference time). In this way, each ticket is issued linked to the corresponding slot
identifier. Just after parking, the driver, by means of the app, will obtain tickets for
those slots in which her car is expected to be parked. Tickets are acquired anonymously
using pre-paid e-coins. Unused tickets can be revoked in advance and refunded with the
amount paid.
This section describes the system and adversary models. After that, it enumerates
the requirements to be satisfied by a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system.
5.4.1 System model
The actors that compose the system model (Figure 5.1) are:
1. Mobile application or app. This is installed and run on drivers’ mobile devices.
The app interacts with the system server during the purchase of pre-paid e-coins,
and during the issuance and revocation of tickets. In case of inspection it is reques-
ted to provide a valid ticket.
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2. System server. This is an on-line platform accessed by apps and officers through
the Internet. It interacts with an app when acquiring e-coins and while issuing or
revoking tickets. During an inspection, it is requested by officers to ask for a valid
ticket from the corresponding app.
3. On-board device. Each car must incorporate an on-board RFID device. It is
accessed by officers during a parking inspection.
4. Officer. He patrols the city checking the payment status of cars. An officer queries
the on-board device of the inspected car and then asks the server to determine
whether or not a ticket exists for that car.
5. Timestamp authority or TSA. This issues timestamps when requested by the
server. Its role is to avoid disputes over double-spent e-coins or revoked tickets.
Figure 5.1: System model
Since tickets for parking are issued for specific time intervals, all the actors’ clocks
must be synchronized.
A push notification service [BM16; RK13] allows data to be sent from servers to
applications. In our system, the app requests an ID PUSH identifier which is sent to the
server together with the car plate number. In this way, the server will be able to send
messages to the corresponding app.
5.4.2 Adversary model
Attacks against the cryptographic primitives are assumed to be unfeasible by setting
appropriate key sizes.
Regarding the capacity of an attacker aiming to attack the privacy of drivers:
• Assumption 1. An adversary cannot corrupt the app or the on-board device.
• Assumption 2. The server and the officers follow the defined protocols but may
collaborate with an adversary by providing the data to which they have access.
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The first assumption is the basis for any secure protocol to make sense. Secure
protocols cannot protect privacy when run on devices infected with malware which may
be transmitting private data directly to the attackers. Integrity of the on-board device
can be achieved by means of tamper-proof hardware.
Regarding the second assumption, any deviation from the correct execution of the
protocols made by the system will be immediately detected by the app. After acquiring
e-coins or generating tickets, the app receives signed data whose correctness is immedi-
ately validated. When an inspection takes place, it also receives data signed by driver’s
on-board unit which can easily be checked. Attacks based on interrupting the system pro-
cedures execution, or the issuance of unfair parking fines by parking officers, would lead
drivers to complain to the city council asking for an alternative service provider. Hence,
assuming that in case of corruption they take honest but curious behavior is realistic.
From the service provider side, drivers are untrusted actors who might try to obtain
parking time for free. Both the app and the on-board device may deviate from protocol
specifications. Their motivation is to obtain parking time for free or avoid the payment
of a fine.
The communications among all the actors should be carried out over a secure transport
protocol, such as TLS [Res18], to avoid external attacks like server spoofing or session
hijacking, and guarantee the confidentiality of all the transmitted data.
5.4.3 Design objectives
This section enumerates and describes the design objectives. Objectives 1 and 2 are
equivalent to those in [GMS17] while objective 3 was implicitly assumed in [BS19]. Ob-
jective 4 was first proposed in [BS19]. They are:
1. The parking status of a car can only be determined as a result of an inspection by
an officer located close to it. The only information obtained by the system during
an inspection is a boolean indicating whether a payment for the present time and
for the inspected car was performed.
2. A driver can prove to a third party that a payment for a given time interval was
made. In that case, no information about other time intervals is revealed.
3. A ticket can be revoked in advance without revealing the car for which it was issued.
4. The app only needs an Internet connection at the beginning of a parking transaction
or when revoking unused tickets.
Objective 1 guarantees that the payment status of a car cannot be tracked automat-
ically (an officer has to be in situ). It also determines that the information collected by
the system provides an advantage to the creation of parking profiles. The information
that an attacker can obtain is exactly the same as they would obtain by roaming parking
places and collecting information about parked cars.
Objective 2 protects drivers against unfair fines while also guaranteeing that no ad-
ditional information is revealed in such a situation. It also allows tickets to be used as
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parking receipts.
Objective 3 allows recovery of the money from unused parking time without any
privacy concern.
Objective 4 states that drivers who paid to park their cars will not be fined due to
their mobile phones being out of coverage during a parking inspection.
5.5 System proposal
5.5.1 System overview
A driver installs an app on her mobile device which manages an electronic wallet that
is pre-loaded with e-coins that can be valued or no-valued. Valued e-coins are acquired
by running the “E-coin request” procedure. The price of a valued e-coin corresponds to
the price for parking during a time slot. They are purchased in batch and paid via some
online payment method like credit card. No-valued e-coins are generated by the app itself
at no cost. When a driver spends an e-coin, the system is unable to determine whether
the received e-coin is valued or no-valued.
Upon parking, a driver obtains a ticket for each of the (consecutive) slots that compose
the expected parking time by running the “Ticket generation” procedure. Each ticket is
paid anonymously via a valued e-coin and stored in the app.
So as to hide the expected parking duration, the app always requests the same amount
of tickets. Those tickets for which the driver expects to be parked are paid using valued
e-coins while the remaining dummy ones are paid with no-valued ones. The app does not
obtain tickets from payments performed with no-valued e-coins. Therefore, the app only
obtains a ticket for those slots for which it has paid (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Abstract graphic
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When an inspection takes place, the officer, by running the “Parking inspection”
procedure, first queries the on-board device of the inspected car and then asks the server
to determine the payment status of that car. The server then runs the “Ticket request”
procedure so as to ask the app for the corresponding ticket.
If the car is removed earlier than expected, unused tickets can be revoked through the
“Ticket revocation” procedure. A valued e-coin is provided in exchange for each revoked
ticket.
5.5.2 System description
The procedures that compose our pay-by-phone parking system are detailed below:
System parameters generation
Prior to its deployment, some parameters have to be created and set.
1. The system server generates the following cryptographic keys:
• An “E-coin” public/private RSA key pair: (NC , eC)/dC .
• A “Ticket” Partially Blind Signature public/private key pair: PS/VS (Sec-
tion 2.6).
2. The system server chooses an elliptic curve E with a large prime cardinality q, and
publishes a generator P of its group of points.
3. The timestamp server generates:
• A “TSA” digital signature public/private key pair: PTSA/VTSA.
All the public keys must be certified by a certificate authority and be made publicly
available. The private keys must be kept secret by the corresponding server.
Remark. The “E-coin” key pair will be used to issue e-coins. The “Ticket” one
will be employed for the issuance of tickets. Timestamps are to avoid disputes about
double-spent e-coins or revoked tickets.
Application set-up
Each driver must install and configure the app on her mobile phone. During this setting
process, the app connects to the on-board device and sends the current time and the car
license plate number.
The on-board device then sets its internal clock, stores the plate number, and gener-
ates a digital signature key pair PD/VD. The private key VD is stored internally while
the public key PD is transmitted to the app, which stores and forwards it to the server.
Remark. This key pair will be used by the on-board device to sign messages which
prove that an officer is located close to the car during an inspection.
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E-coin request
E-coins are data-signature tuples signed under the “E-coin” RSA key-pair. Let dC be the
private key, while (NC , eC) is the public one.
1. A valued e-coin is generated as follows:
(a) The app performs a credit card payment for the price of an e-coin2.
(b) The app generates a random value v ∈ [0, q − 1].
(c) The app computes Q = vP and C = Embed(Q).
(d) The app chooses r ∈ ZNC at random and computes C ′ = Blindr(C). Then, C ′
is sent to the server.
(e) The server signs C ′ under private key dC and sends the resulting signature S
′
to the app.
(f) The app computes S = UnBlindr(S
′) so that {C, S} is a data-signature tuple.
(g) The app stores the e-coin tuple {C, S, v}.
2. A no-valued e-coin is generated as follows:
(a) The app takes S ∈ ZNC at random.
(b) The app computes C = SeC (mod NC).
(c) The app computes Q = Embed−1(C). If the procedure fails (Section 2.7.2),
the app goes back to step 2a.
(d) The app stores the tuple {C, S}. Note that v = logP (Q) is unknown to the
app.
Remark. The difference between a valued and a no-valued e-coin lies in whether or
not v is known.
Ticket generation
A ticket to park a car with plate number License during a given Slot is generated as
follows:
1. The app takes an unspent e-coin (valued or no-valued) and sends its public part
{C, S} to the server.
2. The server checks that {C, S} is a valid message-signature tuple under the “E-coin”
public key.
3. The server verifies that the received e-coin has not been spent before. In such a case,
its previous timestamp would be returned as proof. Otherwise, it asks the TSA to
issue a timestamp on it, and stores its S component together with its timestamp.
4. The server obtains the elliptic curve point Q = Embed−1(C).
5. The app generates a random key K and computes L = HMACK(License). Then,
the app and the server engage in the computation of a partially blind signature
over L with Slot as agreed information. The server encrypts the data sent during
the last round using ECIES under public key Q.
2Valued e-coins will usually be acquired in batch so that a single payment for the overall amount will
be performed.
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6. If the spent e-coin was valued, the app decrypts, using v, the data received from
the last round so that it can obtain a partial signature T = PartialSignS(L, Slot).
Then, the app stores the ticket which consists of tuple {L, Slot,K, T}.
7. Otherwise, if the spent e-coin was no-valued (private key v is unknown), the partially
blind signature cannot be obtained and all the data are discarded.
Remark. The server cannot determine whether or not the app has obtained the
ticket.
Parking inspection
The officer inspects the parking status of a car as follows:
1. The officer queries the on-board device.
2. The on-board device obtains the current Slot from its internal clock. Then, it com-
putes the digital signature SignD(H(Slot||License)). The values for Slot, License,
and their signature are sent to the officer.
3. The officer checks the received values for Slot and License. If they are correct, he
forwards the tuple {Slot, License, SignD(H(Slot||License))} to the server.
4. The server obtains the public key, PD, and the push information associated with
License. Then, it verifies the signature over Slot and License with public key PD.
If it is correct, the server sends a push message to the app.
5. The server expects to receive a valid ticket from the app by means of the “Ticket
request” procedure.
6. If such a ticket is not received the driver will be fined and notified by telematic
means.
Remark. Possession of SignD(H(Slot||License)) is proof that the officer was phys-
ically close to the car during the inspection.
Ticket request
When the app is notified about an inspection for a specific Slot, it runs the following
procedure:
1. The app asks the server to send the signature computed by the on-board device
over Slot and License.
2. The app checks the signature on Slot and License with the on-board public key
PD. If the verification is correct, the app sends the ticket tuple {L, Slot,K, T} to
the server.
3. The server checks that L equals HMACK(License) and verifies the partial signature
T = PartialSignS(L, Slot) under public key PS.
4. The server also verifies that T has not been previously revoked. In such a case,
the server would return its timestamp generated during the “Ticket revocation”
procedure as proof.
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Remark. If the app cannot provide a valid ticket, the driver will be fined (step 6 of
the “Parking inspection” procedure).
Ticket revocation
The driver can revoke unused tickets and obtain valued e-coins in exchange. The app
connects to the server and runs the following procedure for each ticket to be revoked:
1. The app sends the tuple {L, Slot, T} to the server.
2. The server verifies that:
(a) T is a partially blind signature PartialSignS(L, Slot) computed under public
key PS.
(b) Slot is a future time slot.
(c) T has not been revoked previously. If it has, its previous timestamp is returned
as proof.
3. If the ticket can be revoked, the server requests the TSA to timestamp its T com-
ponent and stores the tuple {T,TimestampTSA(T )}.
4. Finally, the app and the server engage in an execution of the “E-coin request”
procedure so that the app obtains a valued e-coin.
Remark. The car plate number is not revealed during the ticket revocation process.
5.6 Privacy and security analysis
This section analyzes the security provided by the proposal under the assumed adversary
model (Section 5.4.2) by proving that it fulfills the design objectives (Section 5.4.3).
5.6.1 Privacy analysis
When a driver parks, her app requests a constant amount of tickets through the “Ticket
generation” procedure. At this moment, the server knows that a parking transaction has
just begun, but it must be unable to determine: (1) The plate number of the car involved;
(2) Which tickets were paid with valued e-coins (so that the expected duration is kept
secret).
Tickets are stored secretly in the app. They are only provided in two cases:
• When an officer located close to the car checks its parking status. The driver’s app
is then asked to provide the ticket corresponding to the current time slot (“Ticket
request” procedure). At this moment, the time at which the ticket provided was
issued should not be revealed so as to keep the parking starting time secret.
• When complaining about an unjust fine. Like before, the ticket issuance time has
to be kept secret.
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• When revoking tickets in advance. In this case (“Ticket revocation” procedure),
both the issuance time and the car plate number must remain secret.
By further requiring that a ticket only provides information about the time slot it was
issued for, and by having tickets digitally signed by the server (they can be proven to be
authentic) the previous statements lead to the fulfillment of the design objectives. The
following lemmas and theorem address them.
Lemma 5.6.1. The information collected by the server during the issuance of a ticket
(“Ticket generation” procedure) cannot be linked to the car license plate number.
Proof. When a valued e-coin is issued (“E-coin request” procedure), the server blindly
signs it, so that it obtains no information about it. No-valued e-coins are issued by the
app with no interaction with the server, so that the server does not obtain any information
about them either. Hence, when a driver spends an e-coin during the issuance of a ticket,
that e-coin (valued or not) cannot be linked to the moment at which it was generated or
to the driver who is providing it.
When a ticket is issued, its content is generated and stored by the app which asks
the server to compute a partially blind signature on it. Hence, the only information the
server obtains about an issued ticket is the time slot it was requested for (the agreed
information of the partially blind signature).
The “Ticket generation” procedure is executed through an anonymous channel which
avoids tracking from the underlying communication protocols.
From Assumption 1, the app cannot be corrupted, so that the system will not obtain
any information but that received from a proper execution of the protocols.
Lemma 5.6.2. The information collected by the server during the issuance of a ticket
(“Ticket generation” procedure) does not allow it to be determined whether or not a ticket
was obtained by the app.
Proof. The app should only obtain a ticket if it has paid with a valued e-coin. When a
ticket is issued, the app spends an e-coin by sending the tuple {C, S} to the server (step 1
of the “Ticket generation” procedure).
The difference between a valued and a no-valued e-coin lies in whether or not the
app has knowledge of the private key v = logP Q . The server cannot determine this.
Therefore, the server cannot infer whether or not the received e-coin was valued, so that
it cannot determine if a ticket was obtained by the app.
From Assumption 1, the app will not provide any additional information to the server.
Lemma 5.6.3. The information provided by a driver when presenting a ticket (“Ticket
request” procedure) for a given time slot cannot be linked to non-inspected slots.
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Proof. The only information obtained by the server from a presented ticket {L, Slot,K, T}
is the car plate number and the time slot for which it was issued.
Tickets for time slots not checked by an officer are kept secret by the app (from
Assumption 1, it will not provide any information about them) so that they cannot be
linked in any manner.
Lemma 5.6.4. The information provided by a driver when revoking a ticket (“Ticket
revocation” procedure) cannot be linked to the car plate number.
Proof. When tickets are revoked in advance, only the tuple {L, Slot, T} is sent by the
app (key K is kept secret). Hence, the car plate number remains secret, since the relation
L = HMACK(License) cannot be checked unless K is known. From Assumption 1, key
K will never be provided by the app.
Theorem 5.6.5. The protocol fulfills the requirements defined in Section 5.4.3.
Proof. Lemma 5.6.1 states that the information collected by the server when issuing
tickets cannot be linked to the car for which they are requested. Lemma 5.6.2 further
states that the server cannot determine the expected duration of the parking transaction
either. As a result of a ticket request, the app only provides a ticket if the server sends
a message signed by the on-board device of the car. Such a signed message can only be
obtained if an officer is close to the car. These signed messages include the current time
slot, so that they can only be employed to obtain tickets for the current slot. Tickets for
other slots are kept secret by the app. Lemma 5.6.3 states that a ticket presented during
an inspection provides information only about the inspected slot. Hence, Requirement 1
is fulfilled.
Since a ticket is digitally signed by the server, a driver can provide it as proof of
having paid for a given time slot. Lemma 5.6.3 guarantees that the server only obtains
the information about the time slot and plate number on the ticket provided. Hence,
Requirement 2 is also met.
Lemma 5.6.4 states that no information, other than the time slot it was issued for, is
revealed from a revoked ticket. Hence, Requirement 3 is fulfilled.
Since tickets issued for all the time slots composing the expected parking duration
are generated at the beginning of the parking transaction, an Internet connection is only
required at that moment. If a parking inspection takes place while the app is out of
coverage, the app will be allowed to send the ticket later. An Internet connection is also
needed for ticket revocation. Hence, Requirement 4 is also satisfied.
5.6.2 Security analysis against malicious drivers
This section contains three lemmas and a theorem which allow it to be concluded that a
malicious driver cannot obtain parking time for free.
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Lemma 5.6.6. Valued e-coins cannot be forged.
Proof. An e-coin consists of a data-signature tuple {C, S} signed under the server “E-
coin” key-pair.
If not obtained (and paid for) through the “E-coin request” procedure for valued
e-coins then an attacker must obtain it by forging or simulating it.
If such a tuple has been forged or simulated by the attacker, its C component, when
provided as input to the Embed−1 procedure (Section 2.7.2), produces a pseudo-random
elliptic curve point Q (or a failure) as a result. An e-coin is valued if and only if its
owner knows v = logP (Q). Since the elliptic curve discrete logarithm is assumed to be
intractable, obtaining v for a random point Q is unfeasible. Hence, valued e-coins cannot
be forged.
Lemma 5.6.7. The proposed e-coin system is secure against double spending.
Proof. Spent e-coins are timestamped and stored by the server. Before accepting an e-
coin, the server checks it has not been spent before. Timestamps allow a previous use of
a double-spent e-coin to be proven.
Lemma 5.6.8. Tickets cannot be obtained from no-valued e-coins.
Proof. During the issuance of a ticket (“Ticket generation” procedure), the app and the
server engage in the computation of a partially blind signature. The data sent from
the server to the app during the last round of the partially blind signature protocol
is encrypted using the ECIES scheme under public key Q obtained from the spent e-
coin {C, S}. The app will only be able to decrypt such data if it knows the secret key
v = logP Q. Since v is only known for valued e-coins, the partially blind signature (and
the ticket) will only be obtained if the spent e-coin is valued.
Theorem 5.6.9. Drivers cannot obtain parking time for free.
Proof. Lemmas 5.6.6 and 5.6.7 state that valued e-coins cannot be forged or spent more
than once. Next, Lemma 5.6.8 guarantees that tickets for parking are only obtained if
paid with a valued e-coin. Hence, we can conclude that tickets are only available to
drivers who paid for them.
5.7 Experimental results
5.7.1 Running time
Our experiments have addressed the computing resources needed by the system server
and the app when running the “E-coin request” and the “Ticket generation” procedures
(Section 5.5.2). The other procedures have a negligible cost.
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System prototypes have been implemented in Java. The app has been developed for
Android using the Java native library java.math.BigInteger when required by crypto-
graphic operations involving big integers.
Our implementation employs 2048 bit cryptography for RSA signatures and for all
the cryptographic operations involving hard-to-solve instances of the discrete logarithm
problem. The key size for elliptic curve cryptography has been set to 224 bits. Hash
digests have been computed using the SHA-256 function.
On the app side, the average time needed to generate 12 valued e-coins, 12 no-valued
e-coins, and 12 tickets has been measured. On the system server side, we have measured
the average time taken to generate 12 valued e-coins and 12 tickets (the server is not
involved in the generation of no-valued e-coins). The ticket generation process is exactly
the same regardless of the use of valued or no-valued e-coins. Our experiments have
involved both serial and parallel executions of all the tested procedures.
Table 5.1: Mobile application running times (in milliseconds)
Mobile phone 12 e-coin 12 e-coin 12 tickets
BQ Aquaris spec. (valued) (no-valued) (valued)
Model Cores GHz Serial Parallel Serial Parallel Serial Parallel
U Lite 4 1.4 4075 1675 1759 779 8238 3411
U 8 1.4 3766 1206 1804 633 6986 2364
Table 5.2: System server running times (in milliseconds)
System server 12 e-coin 12 ticket
(valued)
Processor Cores Threads GHz Serial Parallel Serial Parallel
Intel i5-4310 2 4 3.00 142 72 1402 739
AMD Athlon 4 4 2.80 231 60 2295 635
Intel i7-8700 6 12 3.20 88 16 859 148
AMD Ryzen 7 8 16 4.20 84 10 807 99
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the observed running times. Table 5.1 summarizes the exper-
iments run on the mobile application side over two BQ Aquaris mobile phones. Table 5.2
shows the results on the server side obtained over diverse computers with different pro-
cessors. The first obvious observation is that better running times are obtained from
parallel executions. Memory requirements are negligible in all cases.
In our experiments, a mobile phone can generate all the valued e-coins required to
issue parking tickets for a two-hour parking transaction (12 slots assuming 10 minutes
per slot) in 1206ms (parallel execution on the BQ Aquaris U model). The app can obtain
the 12 tickets of such a transaction in 2364ms.
On the system server side, the best running times were obtained on an AMD Ryzen
7 processor with 8-Cores (16-Threads) at 4.20GHz in parallel mode. These results could
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be extrapolated to a professional server with 64-Cores (128-Threads) at 4.20GHz. Since
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Next, we compare our results with those of [BS19] in which a proposal following the
same paradigm was presented. The running times in [BS19] were obtained after setting
the cut-and-choose security parameter to N = 100 (cheating probability is 1%). Let us
recall that the running times in [BS19] grow linearly with N.
We first compare the mobile application running times needed to generate 12 e-coins
and 12 tickets over the BQ Aquaris U model. Although the new proposal is slower
than [BS19] when generating valued e-coins (1206ms against 420ms), it is much faster in
the case of no-valued ones (633ms against 26976ms). The time needed for the issuance
of 12 tickets has been improved from 13968ms in [BS19] to 2364ms.
Figure 5.3 contains a comparative chart of the mobile application running times
between the current proposal and [BS19].
Figure 5.3: Mobile application running times comparison
On the server side, our new proposal is approximately 8.5 times faster than [BS19]
(60ms against 504ms on an AMD Athlon server) when issuing 12 valued e-coins, and
approximately 80 times faster than [BS19] (635ms against 51192ms) when issuing 12
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tickets. In addition, in our new proposal, the server does not participate in the generation
of no-valued e-coins. That procedure is rather hard in [BS19] in which the server time
required to generate a no-valued e-coin is similar to that required to issue a ticket.
Figure 5.4 contains a comparative chart of the system server running times between
the current proposal and [BS19].
Figure 5.4: System server running times comparison
The obtained running times allow us to conclude that the proposed system could be
deployed in a real environment.
5.7.2 Storage requirements
So as to avoid double-spending frauds, the system server has to store a timestamped copy
of each spent e-coin (step 3 of the “Ticket generation” procedure). Storage requirements
can be reduced by just storing a hash digest of each e-coin together with its timestamp.
By using 256 bit hash digests and 2048 bit RSA signatures for timestamps, storing an
e-coin takes 288 bytes of space. Let us assume 512 bytes per record to allow the inclusion
of some additional metadata.
Assuming 10-minute time slots, each parking bay in a city could generate up to 6
spent valued e-coins per hour or, equivalently, 144 spent valued e-coins per day.
In a large city like Barcelona, with 110,529 on-street parking bays (in 2018), storing
the valued e-coins spent during a day would take around 8 GB. Those spent during a
whole year would take less than 3 TB.
Let us recall that during a parking transaction some no-valued e-coins are spent for
masking purposes. Both types of e-coin are indistinguishable and they have to be stored
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in the same way. We can estimate the storage requirements arising from no-valued e-coins
by assuming the maximum parking time is 2 hours. If the average parking time was 1
hour, each parking transaction would involve the same amount of valued and no valued
e-coins. In this way, storage of no-valued e-coins can be estimated to require around 3
TB.
Hence, 6 TB would suffice to store all the e-coins spent in Barcelona during one year.
Revoked tickets are also stored by the server (step 3 of the “Ticket revocation” pro-
cedure). A revoked ticket only needs to be stored until its time slot expires, which should
not take longer than the maximum parking time. Assuming the maximum parking time
is 2 hours, and each record takes 512 bytes, the storage requirements for revoked tickets in
Barcelona would be upper-bounded by 512×12×110.529 bytes ≈ 663 MB. Nevertheless,
that is a rather loose upper bound and the actual storage would take much less space.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis we have discussed privacy-preserving solutions for vehicular systems. More
specifically, we have focused on pay-by-phone parking systems for public regulated areas
and e-tickets that allow transfers between connecting lines. In all cases, we have analyzed
the current proposals and we have designed protocols that improve the current state of
the art.
Regarding parking systems, we have fulfilled two objectives. Our first objective was
to design a system in which drivers perform a unique payment at the beginning of a
parking transaction. As proposed in [BS19], the drivers pay for a set of tickets when
they start the parking transaction. Tickets are paid with valued and no-valued e-coins to
mask the expected duration of the parking transaction. These tickets cannot be linked
among them. Also, the system server is unable to distinguish whether a given ticket has
been paid with a valued or a no-valued e-coin. In case of inspection, the driver is required
to provide the corresponding ticket which will be valid only if it was paid with a valued
e-coin. Otherwise, the driver will be fined. The proposal guarantees the drivers’ privacy.
The second objective was to design a solution alternative to [BS19] providing a lower cost
by avoiding the use of the cut-and-choose technique. This technique is computationally
expensive because it requires the generation of a large amount of data which is to be
discarded after the checking has been concluded. In [BS20b] we propose a novel system
in which an e-coin contains a public key. The difference between a valued and a no-valued
e-coin lies in whether or not the corresponding private key is known. When a ticket is
generated, the system encrypts the ticket under the public key contained in the spent
e-coin. If that e-coin is valued then the driver will be able to decrypt the ticket by using
the private key.
Regarding e-ticket systems for transportation systems, we noticed a lack of proposals
allowing e-ticket reusability. Hence, we aimed to design a construction allowing current
e-ticket systems to be endowed with that property. So as to preserve users’ privacy, the
system had to be designed so that as a result of an inspection the system is only able to de-
termine whether the inspected user is allowed to perform the current journey. In [BS20a]
we propose a solution that can be coupled to any existing privacy-enabled ticketing sys-
tem. After the purchase and validation of an e-ticket of the underlying system, our
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proposal proceeds by generating a chain of travel tokens. In this way, if T journeys are al-
lowed, a T-element hash chain {chaink}1≤k≤T is generated so that chaink−1 = H(chaink),
with chainT being a random number. These travel tokens are released sequentially each
time the user starts a new journey at the beginning of her trip or after performing a
transfer. In addition, the travel token chain has an expiration time set during its activa-
tion. In order not to reveal the activation time, the protocol uses a zero-knowledge range
proof of a committed value. The system is unable to link the travel tokens of a chain
even after an inspection.
Future work
As future work, we plan to investigate the design of pay-by-phone parking systems in
which the on-board device is able to provide by itself all the information required during
a parking inspection. That is, the on-board device should be able to deliver the ticket to
the officer when an inspection takes place.
We will also investigate other applications for e-coin systems providing valued and
no-valued e-coins. Their features could probably lead to simple and efficient proposals
for priced oblivious transfer protocols or secret sharing schemes.
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and Jean-François Lalande. ‘A Privacy-Preserving NFC Mobile Pass for
Transport Systems.’ In: ICST Trans. Mobile Communications Applications
2.5 (2014), e4. doi: 10.4108/mca.2.5.e4.
[Arf+15] Ghada Arfaoui, Jean-François Lalande, Jacques Traoré, Nicolas Desmoulins,
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Gomila, Arnau Vives-Guasch and Jordi Castellà-Roca. ‘A survey of elec-
tronic ticketing applied to transport’. In: Computers & Security 31.8 (2012),
pp. 925–939. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2012.07.004.
[Nak09] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 2009.
url: http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
[Nat20a] United Nations. The World’s Cities in 2018. 2020. url: https://www.un.
org/en/events/citiesday/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_
data_booklet.pdf.
[Nat20b] United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2020. url: https:
//www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
[NBS77] NBS. FIPS 46. Data Encryption Standard. Federal Information Processing
Standard. U.S. Department of Commerce, Jan. 1977.
[NIS02] NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS-
180-2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Aug. 2002.
[NIS08] NIST. NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Stand-
ard, FIPS-180-3. U.S. Department of Commerce, Oct. 2008.
[NIS12] NIST. NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Stand-
ard, FIPS-180-4. U.S. Department of Commerce, Mar. 2012.
[NIS13] NIST. Digital Signature Standard. Tech. rep. National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2013.
[NIS15] NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS-
202. U.S. Department of Commerce, Aug. 2015.
[NIS93] NIST. NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Stand-
ard, FIPS-180. U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1993.
[NIS95] NIST. Secure hash standard. Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS-
180-1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Apr. 1995.
86 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[NR93] Kaisa Nyberg and Rainer A. Rueppel. ‘A New Signature Scheme Based on
the DSA Giving Message Recovery’. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security. CCS ’93. Fairfax, Vir-
ginia, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 1993, pp. 58–61. isbn:
0897916298. doi: 10.1145/168588.168595. url: https://doi.org/10.
1145/168588.168595.
[Nua+15] Eiman Nuaimi, Hind Neyadi, Nader Mohamed and Jameela Al-Jaroodi.
‘Applications of big data to smart cities’. In: Journal of Internet Services
and Applications 6 (Aug. 2015). doi: 10.1186/s13174-015-0041-5.
[NY89] Moni Naor and Moti Yung. ‘Universal One-Way Hash Functions and their
Cryptographic Applications’. In: Proc. of the 21st STOC. 1989, pp. 33–43.
[OS85] T. Okamoto and A. Shibaishi. ‘A Fast Signature Scheme Based on Quadratic
Inequalities’. In: 1985 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 1985,
pp. 123–123.
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